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*The Social Theory of*  
JAMES MARK BALDWIN



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*JAMES MARK BALDWIN*

By VAHAN D. SEWNY



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## *AUTHOR'S PREFACE*

**T**HE aim of this work is to present a critical analysis of James Mark Baldwin's contributions to social theory.

In the history of American social thought Baldwin is a familiar name, but little more than a name. He is one of the well-known unknowns in the field, occupying a place secure and prominent in the indexes and bibliographies rather than in the texts of many historical studies. In such surveys Baldwin's views are generally associated with those of Charles H. Cooley, but in the light of the unequal attention given to these authors it is not surprising to find that while students of sociology are more or less acquainted with the contributions of the latter, little is known about the real character of Baldwin's work.

Some of the reasons for this are touched upon in the pages that follow. It should be noted here, however, that Baldwin himself was partly responsible for the relative obscurity of his social theory. He scattered his views on this subject throughout a large number of books and articles which can hardly be called readable; his style is ponderous and his use of terminology confusing. This explains, perhaps, why his work has been the victim of labels. One or two points in his system have early been singled out and readily named to catalogue away the whole of his work. This is seen in the comments of several writers who dismiss Baldwin as a mere imitation theorist. The fact that Baldwin started his career as a psychologist is also significant in this connection. It is often presumed that his work has been done in that field mainly and that his interest in social phenomena was incidental or in the nature of a minor side line. It has not always been appreciated that Baldwin wrote at a time when the fences between the various disciplines dealing with man were just beginning to be raised and that it was still possible for one of his range of interests to claim the whole realm of human relations as his domain. In a period when the system of academic enclosures had not as yet been fully established, Baldwin considered himself as much at home in sociology and philosophy as he did in psychology.

To pick for purposes of analysis only one aspect of the contributions of such a thinker involves the danger of losing sight of the whole while studying one of its parts. In selecting from Baldwin's voluminous writings for exposition and criticism what seemed to be relevant to his social theory an effort was made to keep constantly in mind the words that William James wrote when he was once asked to comment on a thesis dealing with his philosophy: "The whole Ph.D. industry of building up an author's meaning out of separate texts leads nowhere, unless you have first grasped his centre of vision, by an act of imagination."<sup>1</sup>

I am grateful to Professor Robert M. MacIver for his interest in this work and the encouragement he has given me in the course of its preparation. For their helpful suggestions I also wish to thank Professors Theodore Abel, Robert S. Lynd, and Robert K. Merton. I am indebted to Professors Joseph Dorfman and Willard W. Waller, and to Dr. John W. Innes for many valuable criticisms. The responsibility for the limitations of the study is, of course, entirely mine.

<sup>1</sup> *The Letters of William James*, ed. by Henry James (Boston, 1920), v. II, p. 355.

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## *Chapter One*

### *LIFE*

AMES MARK BALDWIN was born in Columbia, South Carolina, in 1861. His parents were from Connecticut. Poor health had forced his father to migrate to the South, where he engaged in business and governmental service.<sup>1</sup> Baldwin was brought up in a home environment where life was subjected to the rather rigorous discipline of pious New England traditions. After going through a local private school, where Woodrow Wilson had also received his early education, Baldwin studied at the Columbia Military Academy. Upon graduation he worked two years in a drygoods store; it was the father's belief that a little experience in the business world would help the shaping of his son's character in the right direction. At the age of eighteen, Baldwin enrolled at the Salem Collegiate Institute of New Jersey where he prepared to enter Princeton with the view of eventually going into the Christian ministry. In 1881 he was admitted as a sophomore at Princeton, or the College of New Jersey as it was called in those days.

It was not long before Baldwin found himself attracted to the lectures of James McCosh, the president of the institution. One of the points that the Scottish philosopher was emphasizing in his course on "natural realism," at the time, was the value of the empirical approach in psychology. Wundt's point of view had stimulated him greatly, and he directed his students to read the works of the German scientist. McCosh also exhibited much enthusiasm for the theory of biological evolution. To him there was nothing in this doctrine that could possibly clash with his ideas of the "divine government of the world."<sup>2</sup> The impression that McCosh made on young Baldwin was profound, and

<sup>1</sup> This biographical sketch is based, in large part, on Baldwin's memoirs and letters in his *Between Two Wars*, 2 vols. (Boston, 1926), and his article in *A History of Psychology in Autobiography*, edited by Carl Murchison (Worcester, Mass., 1930), v. I, pp. 1-30.

<sup>2</sup> *History of Psychology in Autobiography*, v. I, p. 2.

did much to stimulate the student's interest in the field of psychology. If his teacher could successfully combine this subject with theology, there was no reason why Baldwin should not follow the example. Upon graduation from Princeton in 1884, a "mental science fellowship" which Baldwin had won in his senior year enabled him to go to Germany. At Leipzig he acquainted himself further with Wundt's work and the laboratory methods of the "new" psychology. Baldwin spent some time also at the University of Berlin where he made an intensive study of Spinoza under Paulsen's guidance.

In 1886 Baldwin accepted an invitation from his Alma Mater to serve as instructor of French and German. A few years after he returned to Princeton he presented his Spinoza study as a dissertation toward the doctorate. Spinoza was one of McCosh's *bêtes noires*, and he refused to accept the material in the form in which it was treated; he directed the student to "refute materialism." Baldwin has noted proudly that it took him only two months to do this, to the complete satisfaction of McCosh.

While teaching languages at Princeton, Baldwin was still thinking seriously of going into the ministry. He attended, for some time, courses in the local Theological Seminary. It was there that he met, and later married, the daughter of William H. Green, the president of the institution and the noted scholar of Hebrew. Baldwin's name appears in the list of the graduates of 1887, but he did not actually complete all the requirements of the seminary to qualify for the ministry. In that year he was invited to the chair of philosophy at Lake Forest University in Illinois. His acceptance of the appointment marked the end of his long hesitation in regard to a future career. He had found the brand of theology taught at the Princeton seminary too rigid and intolerant, and sharply discordant with his growing interests in psychology and philosophy. It is significant that it was while he was taking courses in theology that he translated Théodule Ribot's *German Psychology of Today*.

The atmosphere at Lake Forest, an institution active at the time in the preparation of missionaries to China, was not congenial to the changing tastes of Baldwin. It induced him to work hard on his first book in psychology "as much with the idea of getting a call elsewhere as

of reaping glory.”<sup>3</sup> Shortly after the first volume of his *Handbook of Psychology* was published a call did come from the University of Toronto.

Baldwin went to Toronto, in 1889, to occupy the chair of metaphysics and logic. His first step was to organize a laboratory of experimental psychology—“the first ever opened in the British Empire”<sup>4</sup>—with the approval and support of the president of the University, Sir Daniel Wilson. The Toronto period of Baldwin’s life was marked by the enlargement of another already existing laboratory which had much more to contribute to the development of his system. Baldwin’s home “laboratory of infant psychology”<sup>5</sup> came into existence with the birth of his first child Helen in 1889; a new subject was added in 1891 when a second daughter, Elizabeth, was born. The careful observation of the behavior of his two children formed, as we shall see further, the foundation of Baldwin’s *Mental Development in the Child and the Race* and related works.

While busy with “objective” experiments in his university and home laboratories, Baldwin was asked to serve on a committee appointed by the British Society for Psychical Research, headed by Henry Sidgwick, to study some cases and phenomena of particular interest to that society. This experience stimulated Baldwin to study problems of abnormal behavior, and in 1892 he visited France with the purpose of learning something particularly about the much discussed subjects of hypnotism and suggestion. He observed the investigations of Charcot and Janet at Salpêtrière, and the work of Bernheim in the rival camp at Nancy. Baldwin showed a sympathetic interest in the phenomena of hypnotism, but did not trouble himself much with the polemics of the subject. As to psychical research, he conceded the possible reality of telepathy, but his attitude toward the field always remained one of profound skepticism.

The Toronto years were, on the whole, happy and productive for Baldwin. He was able to complete the second volume of his *Handbook of Psychology* which embodies some of the results of his experimental

<sup>3</sup> *Between Two Wars*, v. I, p. 40.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, v. I, p. 42.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, v. I, p. 43.

work at that institution. The publication of the study helped Baldwin to achieve early recognition both in America and abroad. In 1892, at the age of thirty-one, he was elected vice-president of the International Congress of Psychology in London.

The trustees of Princeton created in 1893 a new chair known as the Stuart Professorship of Experimental Psychology and invited Baldwin to be its first incumbent. Francis L. Patton, the successor to McCosh in the presidency of the institution, notified Baldwin of this decision in a letter in which he was careful to point out that he regarded it "a sine qua non that any one who teaches philosophy in Princeton College should be in full intellectual sympathy with evangelical Christianity as a miraculous revelation of God, and that he should not hold a philosophy that is incompatible with this position."<sup>6</sup> Baldwin accepted the invitation on these terms. However, shortly after his return to Princeton, he explained to Patton that he had a new book ready for publication<sup>7</sup> in which the evolutionary theory had been fully accepted by him as the real key to the understanding of life and the processes of mental growth. The Presbyterian divine told Baldwin that he could consider himself free in the matter of publications, but should be careful to limit his teaching to psychology and not to attempt to invade the fields of philosophy and biology.

A year after his appointment, Baldwin organized a psychological laboratory at Princeton. The researches which were done under his guidance there appeared in a series entitled *Princeton Contributions to Psychology*, four volumes of which were published during his ten year association with that institution. But more important still, from the point of view of the future development of the subject, was the establishment in 1894 of the *Psychological Review* by Baldwin and James McKeen Cattell. The periodical soon grew into an important clearing house of contributions to the field, and a great number of Baldwin's own scientific studies saw light first in the form of articles in the various numbers of the magazine.

In his courses on psychology at Princeton, Baldwin strongly emphasized the social and genetic aspects of the subject. Meanwhile, his con-

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, v. II, p. 229.

<sup>7</sup> *Mental Development in the Child and the Race* (1894).

tinued systematic observations of the behavior of his children supplied the ground of a new book in which the point of view of the earlier study on *Mental Development* was further elaborated. The circumstances that led its author to entitle this new work *Social and Ethical Interpretations of Mental Development* are interesting and significant in view of the fact that the word "ethical" has so often been used since to designate Baldwin's social philosophy. In 1896, shortly after Baldwin had completed the manuscript, the Royal Academy of Sciences and Letters of Denmark announced that its decennial award of a medal would be made to the best work dealing with the social foundations of ethics. Baldwin, who had been interested for some time in the ethical implications of his subject, promptly added to his work two chapters on the problem, inserted the word "Ethical" into the title and sent the study to the Academy under the pen name of Socius. The book won the gold medal. Harald Höffding of the Academy, and a member of the jury, remarks in a letter written to Baldwin at the time: "I had the impression that the paper was a psychological treatise which—on behalf of the ethical consequences of the results—was given as an answer to an ethical question. In the committee there was some scruple owing to this circumstance but we came to an agreement because the ethical consequences were easy to draw."<sup>8</sup> Shortly after this book appeared in 1897 Baldwin was elected to the presidency of the American Psychological Association.

The Princeton period of Baldwin's life is marked by a number of other important publications. His studies of the process of mental growth stimulated in Baldwin a more profound attention to the problems of organic evolution. In a book on *Development and Evolution*, published in 1902, which its author considers a third volume in the *Mental Development* series, he examines the bearing of psychological and social factors upon evolutionary changes in the individual and the group.

The prolific mind of Baldwin was also attracted to another venture about this time. He had long been impressed by the need of a standard lexicographic guide to philosophical and psychological terms and their equivalents in French, German, and Italian. A great number of leading American and foreign scholars responded to his invitation to co-

<sup>8</sup> *Between Two Wars*, v. II, p. 236.

operate on such a work, and in the course of some seven years he was able to produce the rather ambitious *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*. The planning, organization and editing of this work were largely the result of the individual effort of Baldwin. Whether the Dictionary accomplished anything toward the creation of national or international agreement on the meaning of philosophical terms and concepts has been questioned, but there is no doubt that the work helped Baldwin to gain greater recognition here and abroad. The editor spent a year in England to supervise the printing of the volumes at Oxford, and this gave him the opportunity to cultivate more closely the acquaintance of such men as Henry Sidgwick, E. B. Poulton, Bernard Bosanquet, C. Lloyd Morgan, and other contributors to his dictionary. The conferring upon Baldwin of the newly instituted degree of Doctor of Science by Oxford in 1900 was one of the by-products of his visit to England. The University of Glasgow also honored him, the following year, with an LL.D. degree.

Woodrow Wilson, who was made president of Princeton in 1902, had not impressed Baldwin as a man capable of much tolerance or sympathy for the "sciences." As early as in 1896, in a formal address delivered during the sesquicentennial celebration of the University, Wilson had warned of the menace to the humanities which he saw in the "fumes" arising from scientific laboratories. The speech had provoked a prompt and sharp response from Ira Remsen, the president of Johns Hopkins University and a chemist of note. Under Wilson, the difficulties that Baldwin was having for some time with the Princeton administration on certain questions of curricular policy became more aggravated. It was natural that when, in 1903, Remsen invited Baldwin to Johns Hopkins, the latter was more than glad to go. The new position offered increased remuneration and freedom from undergraduate instruction. In a letter which he wrote at the time to Dean H. B. Fine of Princeton, Baldwin says: "My reason is briefly—I can't go into details—that the recent movements in the direction of revising the curriculum and especially in the development of policy in the Graduate School are to me deadening and stifling."<sup>9</sup>

One of the first tasks of Baldwin at Johns Hopkins was the reorganiza-

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, v. II, p. 256.

tion of the psychology department and of the laboratory, with the ardent support of Remsen who provided him with the needed equipment, and funds for added lectureships. The psychological laboratory had originally been established in 1883—the first in America—by G. Stanley Hall, but its work had been discontinued five years later when Hall left for Clark University.

Even though Baldwin did much toward developing Johns Hopkins once again into a strong center of psychological research, his own interests began to turn away from experimental work in the field. His attention was now more fully directed toward larger social and philosophical problems. He had lost his taste for the kind of research that William James had contemptuously characterized as "brass instrument psychology."<sup>10</sup> Baldwin, one of the most ardent of the early advocates of experimental psychology, was now beginning "to feel that there was truth in what James was already proclaiming as to the barrenness of the tables and curves coming from many laboratories."<sup>11</sup>

Baldwin had always been a close student of developments in American philosophic thought, and had written a large number of articles on various technical questions in the field. He now turned to an attempt to present a fuller and more integrated statement of his philosophic position, and the result was a three volume work entitled *Thought and Things; or, Genetic Logic* (1906-11). In these books Baldwin developed a theory of the origin and growth of knowledge. The instrumentalist point of view which he elaborates in that study also formed the basis of a later book on aesthetic valuation.<sup>12</sup>

Upon the suggestion of William T. Harris, Commissioner of Education, Baldwin went to Alaska in 1905, to prepare a report on the educational exhibits from the Territory at the Portland (Oregon) Exposition. During the trip he met Ezequiel A. Chávez, the noted Mexican educator, and the acquaintance resulted in an invitation from the Mexican ministry of public instruction to Baldwin to visit the country as adviser to the authorities then engaged in introducing reforms into the Mexican

<sup>10</sup> Quoted by W. B. Pillsbury, *The History of Psychology* (New York, 1929), p. 244.

<sup>11</sup> *History of Psychology in Autobiography*, v. I, p. 4.

<sup>12</sup> *Genetic Theory of Reality—Being the Outcome of Genetic Logic as issuing in the Aesthetic Theory of Reality called Pancalism* (1915).

educational system.<sup>13</sup> Baldwin's first visit to Mexico during that same year stimulated his interest in the cultural activities of that country to such a degree that later, in 1908, when he left Johns Hopkins,<sup>14</sup> he joined the faculty of the National University of Mexico in the capacity of visiting professor of philosophy and social science.

Baldwin played an important role in the re-establishment of the University of Mexico.<sup>15</sup> In an account of his experiences in that country, he speaks of an address he delivered in which he stressed the need of a national university, and claims that it was directly after this event that the Mexican government announced officially the founding of such an institution.<sup>16</sup> The higher educational system of Mexico was patterned faithfully after the French model, and markedly "Comtian" in theory and practice. In addition to the dominance of French positivism over Mexican thought, Baldwin also noted the keen interest of the educators of that country in the works of Herbert Spencer.

One of the courses that Baldwin taught at the University of Mexico dealt with "psycho-sociology." The material later appeared in book form under the title of *The Individual and Society* (1911). Another of his lecture series in that school led to the publication of a two-volume work on the *History of Psychology* (1913).

Baldwin left Mexico in the fall of 1912. In spite of the fact that his own relations with the University were quite pleasant and cordial, he felt that the strained relations at the time between the United States and Mexico had created an extremely difficult situation for Americans residing in the latter country. Baldwin believed Washington to be responsible for the conflict. He had been, for many years, a great admirer of the Diaz regime of "benevolent" despotism which, he claimed, had

<sup>13</sup> E. A. Chávez, *3 Conferencias [sobre] la vida y la obra de 3 profesores illustres de la Universidad Nacional de Mexico* (Mexico, 1937), pp. 3-28.

<sup>14</sup> It may suffice to note that Baldwin's departure from Johns Hopkins was not the result of a voluntary act. It can only be recorded here that it was brought about by a clash with the school over a matter of personal conduct which the institution regarded as a challenge to its own decorum and authority.

<sup>15</sup> The University of Mexico was originally founded in 1553, but was closed in 1867 by the liberal and republican elements in the country who regarded the institution a center of clerical conservatism. Ernesto Galaza, "The Latin American Universities," in *Bulletin of the Pan American Union*, v. LXXXIII (1939), p. 680.

<sup>16</sup> "Notes on Education in Mexico," in *Nation*, v. LXXXII (Feb. 15 and Mar. 1, 1906), pp. 132-34 and 173-74.

introduced into Mexico a measure of stability necessary for the gradual evolution of an enlightened national life. He approved of Diaz's, and later of Huerta's, lack of faith in the ability of the Mexican masses to live a democratic and free life, and he strongly criticized the unfriendly stand that President Wilson took against Huerta's dictatorial government.

During the period of his association with the University of Mexico Baldwin had visited Paris frequently and had spent a good deal of time in that city. The cultural life of France had always attracted him, and he now moved to that country to settle there permanently.

Baldwin had already established contacts with many of the leaders of French thought. He was elected, in 1910, to succeed William James as Correspondent of the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences of the Institute of France. This honor came to him as a result of the efforts of Théodule Ribot, in recognition of Baldwin's work on the *Dictionary of Philosophy*. It will be remembered that Baldwin's first published book was a translation of Ribot's study of German psychology.

As a member of the Comité France-Amérique, Baldwin began to take an active part in the work of furthering friendly relations between the two countries. In an address, delivered in 1913, he compares American puritanical traditions of culture with French standards in morals and art, and concludes his remarks with a characteristic "vive la France!"<sup>17</sup> Baldwin used every occasion to repeat his admiration for the high level of French cultural life, which he found to be a natural result of that nation's deep-rooted, traditional respect for individual liberty. This enthusiasm for France had its corollary in a growing distaste that Baldwin felt for almost everything associated with German culture. He was psychologically all prepared even before the outbreak of the war to contribute his share to an anti-German crusade.

When the World War finally came Baldwin found himself changed, as he put it, from a person of thought to a man of action. Now, "the questions of philosophy seemed distant and futile . . . The problems of abstract ethics had been charged with vitality by the clash of the forces of right and wrong in the world."<sup>18</sup> He had no doubt, from the very

<sup>17</sup> "French and American Ideals," *Sociological Review*, v. VI (April, 1913), pp. 96-116.

<sup>18</sup> *Between Two Wars*, v. I, p. 301.

beginning, that the Germans were solely responsible for the conflict, and he was fully convinced that the Allied nations were fighting purely for the causes of justice, freedom and democracy. Baldwin promptly volunteered his services, as a writer, to the information bureau of the French ministry of war, and the offer was accepted readily. A similar arrangement having been made with the British authorities, he was allowed to make frequent visits to the front, and his descriptions and comments were given wide circulation during the years of the conflict.

In a volume entitled *Paroles de guerre d'un Américain* (1919) are collected many of the poems, articles and addresses that Baldwin contributed to the Allied cause during the war. A speech that he delivered in 1916 before the Société des Gens de Lettres, on the occasion of his reception to membership, supplies a good example of the degree of German hatred which is evident in all of Baldwin's wartime writings. France "inspired and sublime stands over against another [nation] which is monstrous and hideous. I congratulate you, gentlemen, and with you all the French, on belonging to one, and not to the other!"<sup>19</sup> It was not difficult for Baldwin to explain the cause of the cultural differences between the two nations; Germany being still "at a tribal stage of political development," its people lacked the humanist and cosmopolitan outlook so characteristic of the French.<sup>20</sup>

Baldwin's appraisal of the German people did not change even years after the fury of the war days had died down. He stood strongly in favor of barring contemporary German scientists from all international congresses on the ground that such meetings are "as much social as scientific."<sup>21</sup> His response to persons who preferred to "forgive and forget" is rather interesting: "Somehow one has the feeling—no doubt quite unjust toward individuals—give them half a chance and they would do it all over again! It's in the blood. They have themselves alone to blame if this sort of moral repulsion survives in the hearts of honest-minded men."<sup>22</sup>

A painful experience which Baldwin and his family suffered in 1916 had much to do with the crystallizing of his attitude toward Germany.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, v. II, pp. 92-93.

<sup>20</sup> "France and the War," in *Sociological Review*, v. VIII (1915), pp. 71-72.

<sup>21</sup> *Between Two Wars*, v. II, p. 125.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, v. I, pp. 187-88.

Early that year he had gone to Oxford University to present a paper on the German theory of the state.<sup>23</sup> On the way back to France the steamship *Sussex*, on which he and his family were travelling, was torpedoed by a German submarine, and, as a result, his daughter Elizabeth was severely injured and had a narrow escape from death.

From the very beginning of the war, Baldwin had lost no opportunity to express his exasperation at the reluctance of the United States to join the Allies in the conflict. The *Sussex* affair now supplied him with new ground to carry on with greater vigor and bitterness his attacks against Wilson and his policy of neutrality. In the fall of 1916 Baldwin wrote *A Message from Americans Abroad to Americans at Home*. The document, which was signed by many Americans in England and France, was circulated widely in the United States with the object of influencing the presidential campaign of that year. It was a message imploring the public to choose a government that would promise to reject the peace-at-any-price policy of the Wilson administration. This and other arguments designed to help the Allied cause were expounded by Baldwin in two more works that appeared during the same year: *France and the War* and *American Neutrality, Its Causes and Cure*.

Baldwin was also active, during the war, as chairman of the American Navy League of Paris. The group, organized ostensibly for charitable work, was regarded as a propaganda agency by many in Washington and was opposed on that ground by Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy. Soon after the United States declared war against Germany, Baldwin's services to the Allied effort received official recognition from the French when President Poincaré personally rewarded him with the Cross of the Legion of Honor.

Baldwin continued to live in France after the war. In 1918 he joined the staff of the École des Hautes Études Sociales of Paris, where one of his lecture courses dealt with the history and development of American thought. His work at this school lasted only a few years.

The only work of interest that Baldwin produced in the post-war years is the two-volume collection of his memoirs and letters, entitled

<sup>23</sup> The major point made in that paper is that while in the German view the nation is the instrument of the state, in democracies the state is the instrument of the nation. *The Super-State and the Eternal Values*, Herbert Spencer Lecture (Oxford, 1916), p. 35.

*Between Two Wars* (1926). Although the long string of scientific contributions from the pen of this prolific mind came to an end with the outbreak of the war, Baldwin continued to show keen interest in the trends of research and scholarship in Europe and America. The growth of the Durkheimian school in sociology and the work of Piaget in child psychology particularly attracted his attention and respect. To Freudian psychology his reaction was one of skepticism and suspicion, and as to behaviorism, that to him was physiology rather than psychology.

But the strain of the war years had left Baldwin too exhausted for further serious and scholarly work. Speaking of those years of conflict he has remarked:

Purely theoretical interest in problems of knowledge, time, space, art, philosophy, suffered an eclipse everywhere, and in my own case it was very slow in re-emerging . . . But with it all, I, for one, do not envy the men who held themselves above the melee or took the role of objectors, whether "conscientious" or prudential, during the play of the gigantic moral forces that clashed in those fateful years.<sup>24</sup>

Failing health forced Baldwin to live his last years in retirement. He died in Paris on November 8, 1934.

<sup>24</sup> *A History of Psychology in Autobiography*, v. I, pp. 27-28.

## *Chapter Two*

### *THE INDIVIDUAL: SOCIAL ORIGIN OF THE SELF*

**B**ALDWIN is generally recognized as one of the most important of the pioneer thinkers in social psychology. His work holds a significant place in American sociology because it contributed directly to the development of a school of thought which made the study of the growth of the self basic to an understanding of the processes of society. Again, from a historical point of view Baldwin's contributions are of interest because they brought together, as Brett observes, "the biological, sociological, and psychological trends of thought" of his day, and supplied "the synthesis of ideas which the time had prepared [many] to expect."<sup>1</sup>

Toward the end of the last century, the period when Baldwin began to build his social theory, Darwinian evolutionism and Hegelian idealism were proving two of the strongest forces in America guiding the efforts of many students of man and society. Baldwin's system has its roots mainly in those two sources. When early in his works Baldwin proclaimed that "man is a social outcome rather than a social unit"<sup>2</sup> and that personality should be studied as a social growth, he was championing a developmental and genetic approach that received its chief impulse from Darwin. Baldwin acknowledged this in no uncertain terms when, in later years, he remarked: "My favorite doctrines seem now, when woven together, to have been consciously inspired by the theory of Natural Selection."<sup>3</sup> Although Baldwin was profoundly affected by the Darwinian tradition of his day, his contributions also expressed a strong reaction against the kind of evolutionism that in the

<sup>1</sup> George S. Brett, *A History of Psychology*, v. III, pp. 297-98.

<sup>2</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*, p. 96. (References are to the 5th edition, 1913.)

<sup>3</sup> *Darwin and the Humanities*, p. viii.

theories of Herbert Spencer and his followers had led to a narrow biological view of society. The organicistic school represented an application of Darwinism for which Baldwin could have no sympathy, and he was one of the first to insist that social relations are basically psychological in character and could not possibly be interpreted in purely biological terms. The psychological school in American sociology grew in influence as biological theories of society began to lose their prestige, and this trend received much impetus from the works of Baldwin.

The new evolutionary approach to the individual and society that was being emphasized in Baldwin's day marked a movement away from the atomistic and purely structural interpretations that were so dominant up to that time in much of the psychological and sociological literature. Students of group life began to focus their interest on function and development and were no longer preoccupied solely with the building of formal and logically rigid and static schemes of interpretation. It was in this intellectual atmosphere that Baldwin's work took form, and it has been generally recognized that he was one of the leaders who "furthered the functional and evolutionary attitude towards psychology"<sup>4</sup> and the social studies. However, even though Baldwin considered himself a thoroughgoing evolutionist, he did not regard the evolutionary process as something tentative or groping in character. To him, evolution in its operation in individual and social growth revealed a course marked by a definite pattern of stages. This contention echoed a point of view that was more Hegelian than Darwinian in essence.

Baldwin found in Hegel's dialectical formula a convenient key to the study of the growth of the self and of society. This aspect of Baldwin's social theory will be discussed in some detail in the pages that follow. It should be noted here, however, that Baldwin not only adopted the Hegelian dialectical scheme, but the underlying philosophy of idealism as well. Baldwin claimed that the essence of the social is to be found in thought and consciousness. He also held that as the self, through the dialectical process, grows to the level of full social consciousness it becomes an ethical self or person. In these two basic points Baldwin's social theory represents a clear reflection of Hegelian idealism. The fact that Baldwin never labeled himself as a Neo-Hegelian is of little

<sup>4</sup> W. B. Pillsbury, *The History of Psychology* (New York, 1929), p. 252.

importance; that he identified himself with that philosophical tradition is obvious in his statement that the main conclusions of his social theory are in "fundamental agreement" with those of Josiah Royce.<sup>5</sup>

But even though Neo-Hegelian concepts formed the core of Baldwin's social philosophy, his studies of the individual and the group were made at a period when a strong reaction was already developing against investigations of those subjects conducted on introspective and *a priori* bases. Fully conscious of this new trend, Baldwin was determined to root his own speculations in the solid ground of research. This was a time when, in the words of L. L. Bernard, "the new way of looking at subjective processes collectively as objective entities was, so to speak, in the air."<sup>6</sup> In social psychology Wilhelm Wundt had been achieving wide recognition for having raised the subject from metaphysics to an inductive discipline. As one of the disciples of the German scientist, Baldwin played an important role in furthering the view that the experimental method provides the only valid approach to the study of human behavior. Wundt's influence on Baldwin went far beyond this. According to Karpf, Wundt held that "psychology has two exact methods, like all other natural sciences: the experimental, by means of which the simpler individual processes can be analyzed; and the observational or folk psychological, by means of which the higher social processes must be investigated."<sup>7</sup> The study of folk psychology in Germany and the emphasis on the need of developing such a discipline to supplement investigations of purely individual behavior has been generally regarded as one of the important factors contributing to the growth of social psychology in America. The movement also had much to do with the shifting of attention in sociology from biological to the psychological elements operating in group phenomena.

Baldwin's interest in the social aspects of individual behavior was to some degree stimulated by Wundt's work on folk psychology. However, from the point of view of the relation between the individual and society Wundt's contributions suggested a gap that was left to Baldwin and others later to correct. In the words of Karpf again,

<sup>5</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. viii.

<sup>6</sup> *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (New York, 1926), p. 27.

<sup>7</sup> Fay B. Karpf, *American Social Psychology* (New York, 1932), p. 54.

We get two systems in Wundt's psychological theory: one, of the subjective individual consciousness; and the other, of the objective products of the "collective consciousness," being left very much in the dark as to just how the mystical synthesis, the "folk mind" of folk psychology, actually comes into being and how it functions.<sup>8</sup>

To solve this problem or to supply the needed bridge between the self and the group, Baldwin turned to child psychology, a subject in which Wundt had shown no interest.

Systematic research in child psychology began in the closing years of the nineteenth century. The ground for this new field was already prepared by the wide interest that evolutionary thought had directed to genetic and developmental processes, and by advances in experimental physiology and psychology. Among earlier studies of child psychology the most notable were Darwin's *A Biographical Sketch of an Infant* (1877), and Wilhelm Preyer's *The Mind of the Child* (1881). The latter work gave particular attention to the place of imitation in the child's life. In America wide interest in child psychology was a direct result of the contributions of G. Stanley Hall. Hall was an ardent advocate of the genetic point of view, but his studies of child behavior suffered serious limitations as a result of the emphasis that he placed on purely biological factors and upon the doctrine of recapitulation.

This doctrine was developed chiefly by Ernst Haeckel, the German biologist. Seven years after the appearance of Darwin's *Origin of Species*, Haeckel came forth with his "biogenetic law" and contended that "ontogeny repeats phylogeny," that the human embryo during the course of its development passes through stages that resemble the main stages of the biological evolution of the race. The recapitulation theory attracted attention when Herbert Spencer used it as a basis of interpretation of the primitive mind. The theory was popularized further by Hall who held that the child in his growth repeats the stages of human mental and cultural evolution just as the embryo passes through the stages of human biological evolution. "There was a simple grandeur in all this which appealed to the imagination," notes Murphy; "based as it was on faulty anthropology, it could not mislead students of childhood, who have, in fact, failed to find any uniform pattern of stages in the child's

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 57.

interests, except in so far as the child's own physical and intellectual growth and his social surroundings impose them.”<sup>9</sup>

Baldwin followed Hall's example in the use of the recapitulation formula as a basis of his genetic theory, but, unlike Hall, he recognized the primary importance of psychological factors in individual development and felt the inadequacy of interpretations limited to a consideration of biological and physiological forces. Baldwin points out that his own approach is essentially “psychogenetic” in character, rather than “biogenetic.” He defines the psychogenetic approach as “that method which inquires into the psychological development of the human individual in the earlier stages of his growth for light upon his social nature, and also upon the social organization in which he bears a part.”<sup>10</sup>

A few years before Baldwin began to formulate his social theory, William James in his *Principles of Psychology* had made some significant observations on the social nature of personality development. James viewed the “social self” as an aspect of the total individual selfhood which, in his opinion, also has its “material,” “spiritual,” and “pure ego” aspects. “Properly speaking,” writes James, “a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind”; in other words, “a man's social self is the recognition which he gets from his mates.”<sup>11</sup> In spite of the fact that James failed to develop these ideas, their significance as guides to further speculation on the subject has been widely recognized. “Big books,” remarks Dewey, “have been written since which are hardly more than an amplification of the suggestions” found in James.<sup>12</sup> And House is of the opinion that Baldwin's theory of the dialectic of personal growth “may be regarded as an elaboration of the implications of James' concept of the social self.”<sup>13</sup>

Baldwin was well-acquainted with the work of James and his “remarkable and valuable analysis of the self notion.”<sup>14</sup> In his own speculations on this subject, however, Baldwin went much further than

<sup>9</sup> Gardner Murphy, *A Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology* (London, 1929), pp. 282-83.

<sup>10</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 2.

<sup>11</sup> William James, *Principles of Psychology* (1890), v. I, pp. 292-93.

<sup>12</sup> John Dewey, “The Need for Social Psychology,” in *Psychological Review*, v. XXIV (1917), p. 266.

<sup>13</sup> Floyd N. House, *The Development of Sociology* (New York, 1936), p. 316.

<sup>14</sup> *Fragments of Philosophy and Science*, p. 384.

James, and considered the whole self as a social self instead of making the social a mere aspect of personality. Whatever the extent of James' influence on Baldwin may have been, it would be a mistake to suggest that the latter's work simply represented an amplification of ideas gathered from that source. In the newly developing field of social psychology Baldwin, as a pioneer thinker, far from being satisfied with what others had already done, was anxious to discover a solid ground in which the foundations of the discipline might be laid. He found that the systematic observation of the development of the child's personality supplied the most promising ground for a start toward the study of the wider phenomena of social relations. In the opening pages of his first important book on this problem, Baldwin remarks:

It has never been adequately realized that it is in genetic theory that social or collective psychology must find both its root and its ripe fruitage. We have no social psychology, because we have had no doctrine of the *socius*. We have had theories of the *ego* and the *alter*; but that they did not reveal the *socius* is just their condemnation. So the theorist of society and institutions has floundered in seas of metaphysics and biology, and no psychologist has brought him a life-preserver, not even heard his cry for help.<sup>18</sup>

The trends of thought that we have discussed above are, of all the influences to which Baldwin may have been subjected, the ones that are most directly and conspicuously reflected in his social theory. They are the trends associated with the names of Darwin, Hegel, Wundt, Hall, and James. Baldwin's genetic and functional point of view had its roots in Darwinian evolutionism; his philosophy of idealism and his dialectical formula can readily be traced to Hegel; as an advocate of positive and experimental methods, he was a follower of Wundt; his interest in child psychology was stimulated, at least partly, by the work of Hall; and, finally, in James he found some thoughts on the social nature of the self that were to supply fertile ground for systematic studies of the subject.

These influences no doubt supplied underpinning and form to Bald-

<sup>18</sup> *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*, p. ix. (References are to the 3rd edition, 1906.)

win's system, but, on the whole, what he had to say was his own and expressed his own particular way of looking at life.

Baldwin's sociological theories have their foundation in his views on the social self and its development. It was in a genetic study of the individual that he sought the key to an understanding of the larger processes of social life. The first major problem was to discover the nature of the growth of the self. That Baldwin considered this inquiry of primary significance in his system is evident in the following remark: "In spite of the large place which I assign to Imitation in the social life, I should prefer to have my theory known as the 'Self' or 'Self-Thought' theory of social organization."<sup>16</sup>

The basic point that Baldwin makes about the self is that it is a "social product." The self emerges from the interactions between the individual and the group. This give-and-take process he describes as a "dialectic of personal growth." The old atomistic concepts of the self he rejects as false; they rest on the assumption that the individual and society are separate entities. The individual, on the contrary, is always a part of the group out of which he has emerged. When considered in this light, the individual or self may also be called a "socius."

Every man is a *socius*, and . . . every society reveals the *socius*. It follows from this, that there are two fundamental inquiries at the bottom of any adequate theory of society. The first is this: How far a complete knowledge of the individual man in society would also be a complete revelation of the society which he is in? And the second question is this (the reverse of the other): How far is it necessary to understand society, as it actually exists, in order to construct an adequate view of the man's actual nature and social possibilities?<sup>17</sup>

To find a solution to the first of these questions, Baldwin turned to a study of the nature of the growth of the self in the child. His observations and interpretations of this subject are presented "as the point of departure for the main positions developed" in his social theory.

Three main stages are noted by Baldwin in the "dialectic" development of the self—the "projective," the "subjective," and the "ejective."

<sup>16</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. xviii.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 193.

As early as in the second month of life, the child begins to distinguish between persons and inanimate objects in his immediate environment. Furthermore, he begins to respond to "suggestions of personality" and to recognize differences in the personalities of the mother, nurse, or others around him. At this stage, the mind of others is to the child a source of unstable and capricious experiences and actions. He identifies mind with the physical person of others, or he projects it into them.

The transition from the projective to the subjective stage occurs as the child's range of activities and accommodations grow and he begins to imitate others. Up to this time, the child feels his own experiences of strains, resistances, pains, pleasures, etc., as peculiarly his own and as experiences that others lack. But when he starts imitating the actions of other persons, he begins to interpret the projective characteristics of others in terms of his own personal, subjective experiences. The subject self is now more clearly differentiated from others.

However, the self does not come fully into being until the individual enters the ejective level of development. That last stage is reached as

the child's subject sense goes out by a sort of return dialectic to illuminate the other persons. The "project" of the earlier period is now lighted up, claimed, clothed on with the raiment of selfhood, by analogy with the subjective. The subjective *ejective*; that is, other people's bodies, says the child to himself, have experiences *in them* such as mine has. They are me's; let them be assimilated to my me-copy. This is the third stage; the ejective, or social self, is born.

The "ego" and the "alter" are thus born together. Both are crude and unreflective, largely organic. And the two get purified and clarified together by this twofold reaction between project and subject, and between subject and eject. My sense of myself grows by imitation of you, and my sense of yourself grows in terms of my sense of myself. But *ego* and *alter* are thus essentially social; each is a *socius* and each is an imitative creation.

This give-and-take between the individual and his fellows, looked at generally, we may call the Dialectic of Personal Growth.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14. It may be of interest to note that Baldwin did not use the term "dialectic" when he first presented this formulation of the social growth of the self in the earlier work, *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*.

Baldwin gives an interesting explanation as to how he came to develop this theory. At an early stage in his systematic observations of the behavior of children, he had been impressed with the important place that imitation occupied in their actions, especially when these actions contained the element of volition. "Further study of this subject," he says, "brought what was to me such a revelation of the genetic function of imitation that I then determined—under the inspiration, also, of the small group of writers lately treating the subject—to work out a theory of mental development in the child, incorporating this new insight." Baldwin was also busy, at the time, reading "the literature of biological evolution, with view to a possible synthesis of the current biological theory of organic adaptation with the doctrine of the infant's development," as he had already been led to "the conviction that no consistent view of mental development in the individual could possibly be reached without a doctrine of the race development of consciousness,—i. e. the great problem of the evolution of mind."<sup>19</sup>

What Baldwin was trying to do was to translate the doctrine of recapitulation from biological to psychological terms. His dialectic of personal growth rests on the assumption that in the mental growth of the child one sees a repetition of the stages through which society passes in its development or evolution. "The infant is an embryo person, a social unit in the process of forming; and he is, in these early stages, plainly recapitulating the items in the social history of the race . . . The embryology of society is open to study in the nursery."<sup>20</sup>

The importance of Baldwin's theory of the self lies mainly in the fact that it represents one of the first attempts to stress the interdependent character of the relationship between the individual and society. The weakness of the theory is to be found in the "scientific" interpretations that it offers of the nature of that relationship in terms of recapitulation and imitation.

What Baldwin had to say on the nature of the self was something of a revelation to many, at a time when individualistic and atomistic conceptions still dominated social thought: "Society, genetically considered, is not a composition of separate individuals . . . the individual is a 'social outcome' not a social unit";<sup>21</sup> "all views of the man as a total

<sup>19</sup> *Mental Development*, p. vii.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 148.

<sup>21</sup> *History of Psychology in Autobiography*, p. 5.

creature, a creation, must recognize him not as a single soul shut up in a single body to act, or to abstain from acting, upon others similarly shut up in similar bodies; but as a soul partly in his own body, partly in the bodies of others, to all intents and purposes, so intimate is this social bond . . .";<sup>22</sup> "the real self is the bipolar self, the social self, the *socius*."<sup>23</sup>

Although many of Baldwin's contemporary and later critics have fully recognized the value of these observations, most of them are agreed that he failed to give a satisfactory answer to the questions how the social self comes into being and what actually is the nature of the bond between the individual and the group. This reaction to Baldwin's work is expressed, in perhaps too sharp a form, in the following criticism by John Dewey:

As a negative result on the sociological side, that is, as against those who would assert individuals independent of society or society independent of psychical individuals, [Baldwin's] discovery of the interdependence is of value. But I do not see that we know any more of the psychology of the sense of personality and of society than we did before . . . Baldwin's method in simply sending us from society to the individual, and from the individual to society, fails as a matter of fact to establish even this interdependence. It leaves us where we began with society and individual, and a reciprocal influence of each on the other.<sup>24</sup>

Dewey holds that Baldwin's failure to provide an adequate interpretation of this reciprocal relationship is the result of the fact that the latter has tried to explain all interaction in terms of the mechanism of imitation.

The elements of imitation and recapitulation have, undoubtedly, proved the major limitations of Baldwin's social theory. Karpf writes:

These features of Baldwin's theory, important as he regarded them at the time, have come to be looked upon as incidental details in the formulation of his point of view as a whole, which in its larger social-psychological aspects may be said to mark the real beginning of social-

<sup>22</sup> *Mental Development*, p. 145.

<sup>23</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 30.

<sup>24</sup> *Philosophical Review*, v. 7 (1898), p. 401.

psychological thought in this country as well as an important new phase of social-psychological thought generally.<sup>25</sup>

One would hardly question the prominent place that Baldwin holds in the history of social psychology, but it is difficult to agree that imitation and recapitulation should be regarded as merely "incidental details" in his general point of view. The fact is that Baldwin used these as key concepts in his interpretations of not only personality growth, but also of the larger aspects of social relations. The bearing of the recapitulation doctrine upon his theory of evolution and progress will be taken up in a later chapter. We shall turn here to a fuller consideration of the place that the concept of imitation holds in his theory of the social self.

Imitation in Baldwin's scheme is the most important "tool of socialization." His view of the dialectic of personal growth rests on this assumption. The child's sense of self develops as he imitates others and begins to recognize others as "subjects" having experiences similar to his own. The social self comes into being when, through imitation, the child begins to understand the inner life of others in terms of his own and, by a return process, to understand his own life in terms of theirs.

Imitation is an innate impulse in man and lies at the root of all learning that makes his further socialization possible. The individual does not learn to imitate, as some critics of the theory have pointed out, but he imitates to learn, according to Baldwin. It is imitation that makes possible for man to learn and take his place in the group as a social being. "In order to be social he must be imitative, imitative, imitative." While Baldwin stresses this point, he is well aware that imitative learning alone is insufficient as an explanation of human society since such learning can be observed to be present also in animal groups. Man differs from other animals by the plasticity of his nature and by his ability to acquire and use speech as a means of communication. Imitative learning in the case of man is not the mechanical process that the word "imitative" might suggest. It means learning the language and traditions of the group; "learning not by himself and at random, but under the leading of the social conditions which surround him. Plasticity is his safety and the means of his progress. So he grows into the social

<sup>25</sup> Karpf, *American Social Psychology*, p. 275.

organization, takes his place as a *Socius* in the work of the world . . ." The individual's life is shaped by the influences, or "social suggestions," that he receives from his particular environment. "All that is characteristic of the race or tribe or group or family—all this sinks into the child and youth by his simple presence there in it, with the capacity to learn by imitation."<sup>26</sup>

Baldwin's theory of imitation is often associated with the contributions that Walter Bagehot and Gabriel Tarde have made to this subject. However, these writers, as Kimball Young observes, "did not deal with the psychological mechanisms behind imitation but assumed that man possessed a propensity or inherent tendency to imitate."<sup>27</sup> Their views of imitation were based largely on observations of apparent uniformities in society. It was Baldwin who tried to give to the concept scientific underpinning by attempting to explain imitation in terms of personality development. From this point of view, his work has more in common with that of Royce on this subject than with the theories of the authors mentioned above. Imitation is seen as primarily the means to the growth of the social consciousness of the self by both Baldwin and Royce. In an analysis of the latter's views on this subject, Mead says:

Royce makes out of consciousness of one self over against other selves the source of all reflection . . . Only through imitation and opposition to others could one's own conduct and expression gain any meaning for one's self, not to speak of the interpretation of the conduct of others through one's own imitative response to their acts. Here we stand upon the familiar ground of Professor Baldwin's studies of social consciousness. The *ego* and the *socius* are inseparable, and the medium of alternative differentiation and identification is imitation.<sup>28</sup>

The striking similarity between the approaches of Baldwin and Royce is particularly evident when we consider what the latter had to say about the role of imitation in the mental growth of the child. After remarking that he and Baldwin reached their conclusions on this matter "pretty independently," Royce writes:

<sup>26</sup> *Story of the Mind*, p. 207.

<sup>27</sup> Kimball Young, "Imitation," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, v. VII, p. 587.

<sup>28</sup> George H. Mead, "Social Psychology as Counterpart of Physiological Psychology," in *Psychological Review*, v. 6 (1909), pp. 401-02.

We are clear that the infant, in the first months of life, has nothing that we should call self-consciousness. The first clear evidence that we get of the presence of a form of self-consciousness intelligible to us comes when the infant begins to be observantly imitative of the acts, and later of the words, of the people about it. In other words, the first Ego of the child's intelligible consciousness appears to be, in its own mind, set over against a non-Ego that, to the child, is made up of the perceived fascinating, and, to its feeling, more or less significant, deeds of the persons in its environment. From this time on, up to seven or eight years of age, any normal child remains persistently, although perhaps very selectively, imitative of deeds, of habits, of games, of customs . . . Now the psychological importance of imitation lies largely in the fact, that in so far as a child imitates, he gets ideas about the inner meaning or intent of the deeds that he imitates, and so gets acquainted with what he really finds to be the minds of other people.<sup>29</sup>

Most commentators on Baldwin's imitation theory ignore its close relation to Royce's view on this matter, and repeatedly presume that Baldwin was merely a follower of Tarde, or that the main thesis of *Mental Development* and of *Social and Ethical Interpretations* is based on ideas borrowed directly from the French sociologist.<sup>30</sup> Baldwin has tried to correct this impression by maintaining that it was after the publication of his above mentioned books that he first became acquainted with Tarde's contributions. Baldwin explains his points of agreement with Tarde as "more a coincidence than a direct connection."<sup>31</sup> The question of whether in his theory of imitation Baldwin was imitating Tarde is further answered in a letter from the French sociologist in which he tells Baldwin that "by your independent researches you have come as I have to consider imitation as the corner stone of sociology."<sup>32</sup> In another communication Tarde says that even though he and Baldwin attach primary importance to imitation, their treatments of the con-

<sup>29</sup> Josiah Royce, *Studies of Good and Evil* (New York, 1910), pp. 182-83. (From a paper written in 1894—"Some Observations on the Anomalies of Self-Consciousness.")

<sup>30</sup> Typical of such interpretations is the following: Baldwin's *Mental Development* "applied Tarde's theory of imitation to explain the results obtained from studying his young daughter." W. B. Pillsbury, *The History of Psychology* (New York, 1929), p. 252.

<sup>31</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. viii.

<sup>32</sup> *Between Two Wars*, v. II, p. 243.

cept are quite different. Tarde points out that he took the social fact of imitation as a "point du départ" in his sociological works, whereas to Baldwin the concept has been a "point d'arrivée" via investigations of individual psychology.<sup>83</sup> In connection with the question of priority, it may be of interest to note also that both Tarde and Baldwin have claimed to have had no knowledge of Bagehot's theory of imitation when they made their own studies of the subject. "Considered from the sociological side," remarks Baldwin, "the intuition that the method of social propagation is imitation, undoubtedly belongs first of all to the great English publicist, not to raise the question of still earlier intimations of it."<sup>84</sup>

Baldwin made an important distinction between his own view of imitation and the theories held by Bagehot and Tarde. To Baldwin imitation meant a method, a process of socialization. Bagehot and Tarde also advanced this view, but they went further to identify imitation with the "social fact." Baldwin was careful to point out that it is necessary to make a clear distinction between socialization and that which is socialized or is *the social*. "Imitation is not social unless it be the means of organizing a certain sort of material, and the material is not social unless it be imitatively organized. Self-thoughts imitatively organized are, I contend, the essence of what is social."<sup>85</sup>

It was suggested earlier that Baldwin and Royce were the first to seek the roots of imitation in individual development, through a genetic approach to child behavior. "With these later writers," it is noted, "imitation takes on a significance which is somewhat technical and broader than the significance which it has either with Tarde or in the ordinary use of the term."<sup>86</sup> As Davis remarks, "had Tarde taken up the contributions which Genetic Psychology would have given him, . . . [he] might have approached the general problems of his Sociology from the standpoint of the individual as well from that of the group."<sup>87</sup>

Baldwin gave an explanation of imitation in terms of physiological

<sup>83</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. xii.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xii.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xviii.

<sup>86</sup> R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago, 1921), p. 390.

<sup>87</sup> Michael M. Davis, *Psychological Interpretations of Society* (New York, 1909), pp. 132-33.

psychology, thus making it a basic principle of individual as well as group behavior studies. He considered imitation a type of "circular reaction."<sup>38</sup> By this he meant that the human organism has an innate tendency to maintain the stimuli that have caused a reaction and to repeat the movement as a result of the repetition of those stimuli. As Baldwin puts it, "an imitative reaction is one which tends normally to maintain or repeat its own stimulating process."<sup>39</sup> This "organic" imitation, which operates on the biological and unconscious level, comes first in the order of growth and is at the root of all the habits and accommodations that the individual develops. Organic imitation should be distinguished from "social" imitation which emerges later and involves the repetition of "copies" or the various forms of thought and behavior to which the individual is exposed in the group.

It should be noted here that Baldwin's "circular reaction" theory has been used by some behaviorists, particularly by Floyd H. Allport, to interpret imitation in early childhood without "recourse to the defunct theory of the 'instinct of imitation.'"<sup>40</sup>

Baldwin regarded imitation as a "tendency," "impulse," or "disposition" rather than an instinct. He attacked vigorously all theories that find in the concept of instinct a ready explanation of social life. He criticized particularly the view that human society is the result of a gregarious instinct. Such an instinct may be responsible for group life among some animals, he conceded, but in the case of human organization the relationships are too complex to be the result of a simple instinctive mechanism. It was the opinion of Baldwin that since human society represents a higher stage on the evolutionary scale, to interpret

<sup>38</sup> *Mental Development*, chap. IX and XII; also pp. 465-67. It may be of interest to note that the theory first appears in this social-psychological study. The concept of imitation received no great emphasis in Baldwin's two earlier books on psychology. The only mention of the subject in his *Handbook of Psychology* is the following: "The imitative faculty of children shows [the] tendency to carry out all movements thought of." (Vol. I, p. 74.) In his *Elements of Psychology* he begins to view the problem in a new light: "After the sixth or seventh month imitation of others' movements becomes [the child's] prevailing reaction. In 'persistent imitation'—the try-try-again experience—we have the first voluntary efforts of the child . . . It involves a subjective reference more distinct and peculiar to itself than any of the purely affective sensations, and leads on to the notion of the *I* and so to *self-consciousness*." (pp. 60-61).

<sup>39</sup> *Mental Development*, p. 333.

<sup>40</sup> Gardner Murphy, *A Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology* (London, 1929), p. 275.

it as the result of gregariousness involves the error of "levelling the higher down to the lower."<sup>41</sup> At the human level we have the element of "social heredity" supplementing the "physical heredity" of animal life.<sup>42</sup> It is through the acquisition of the habits, customs, and traditions of the group that individuals become part of society. And the acquisition and transmission of the social heritage is done through learning. "The man who is fit for social life *must* be born to learn."<sup>43</sup> But behind man's capacity to learn is his capacity to imitate. As was pointed out earlier, Baldwin regarded imitation as an innate tendency rather than as an instinct. The more an animal is teachable or depends upon learned behavior, the less he is equipped at birth with definite instincts. Or, as Baldwin puts it, "the influence of social heredity is, in a large sense, inversely as the amount and definiteness of natural heredity."<sup>44</sup> Everything in man's behavior reflects primarily his social heredity. What is exclusively "private" or innate in an individual is perhaps impossible to determine, observes Baldwin.

In spite of these reservations, in Baldwin's system imitation has actually been treated as though it were a definite innate tendency to stereotyped behavior in very much the same manner in which the operation of instincts is generally conceived. While Baldwin was impatient with explanations of social behavior in terms of instincts, his theory of imitation suggests the kind of simple, one-way, individual-to-society process of socialization that is characteristic of instinct theories. No one would deny that imitation is an important element in social interaction. The chief weakness of Baldwin's theory lies in the fact that he considered imitation to be the only important element. To him, "the social process is imitation."<sup>45</sup> In his studies of the growth of the child, Baldwin saw in imitation a ready-made mechanism of adaptation to the social environment. On the other hand, in his emphasis on social heredity and learning he was careful to show that plasticity is a distinctive characteristic of man and makes possible his accommodation to the group. In spite of the fact that Baldwin gave to imitation a genetic and broad meaning, he failed to reconcile the principle of imitative action with the notion of

<sup>41</sup> *Mental Development*, pp. 18-19.

<sup>42</sup> *Story of the Mind*, p. 207.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 531.

<sup>44</sup> *Development and Evolution*, p. 68.

<sup>45</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 70.

variations in response that accommodative behavior implies. As Ellwood points out, "there may be a biological and an instinctive basis for imitation, but back of the imitation in human society stands not only impulse, but habit and intelligence. It seems rather far-fetched at the present time to attempt to reduce these three factors to some *one* type of reaction which we might call imitative . . . Baldwin's theory of the part which imitation plays in human society seems to us an oversimplification."<sup>46</sup>

An even more serious difficulty with Baldwin's imitation theory is that in his treatment of the growth of the self he introduces imitation at a stage (the "subjective") when the individual is not as yet conscious of the minds and of the behavior of other persons in terms of his own. Baldwin claims that this is accomplished once the child begins to imitate other selves. It would be more reasonable to assume that imitation follows rather than precedes such an experience. In this connection, Mead has this to say about Baldwin's imitation theory:

Young children . . . may be stimulated to many reactions which are like those which directly or indirectly are responsible for them without there being any justification for the assumption that the process is one of imitation—in any sense which is connoted by that term in our consciousness. When another self is present in consciousness doing something, then such a self may be imitated by the self that is conscious of him in conduct, but by what possible mechanism, short of a miracle, the conduct of one form should act as a stimulus to another to do, not what the situation calls for, but something like that which the first form is doing, is beyond ordinary comprehension. Imitation becomes comprehensible when there is a consciousness of other selves, and not before.<sup>47</sup>

Let us turn now to the relationship between imitation and invention in Baldwin's scheme. The concept of invention has a large place in his interpretations of social organization and progress and will be considered in some detail in the pages dealing with those subjects. Here invention

<sup>46</sup> Charles A. Ellwood, "The Social Philosophy of James Mark Baldwin," in *Journal of Social Philosophy*, v. II (1936), p. 67.

<sup>47</sup> Mead, *op. cit.*, p. 405.

will be discussed briefly from the point of view of its place in the development of the self.

In Baldwin's view, inventiveness is an integral part of the imitative process. "Psychological analyses of the child's activities show," he says, "that imitativeness and inventiveness are really two phases of all action; that the terms are expressions of emphasis rather than of real and vital difference."<sup>48</sup> The child invents as he carries his imitations out into action. In the dialectic of personal growth invention reveals itself in two aspects—personal and social. As the child develops from the "projective" to the "subjective" stage, he begins to imitate and by that very act he also invents. "His originalities arise through his action, struggle, trial of things for himself in an imitative way."<sup>49</sup> In other words, the child's inventions are the result of his efforts to meet new situations through imitation. This is the personal aspect of the process of invention. Invention has also a social aspect in the sense that when the child reaches the "ejective," or final, stage of growth he reads his subjective experiences into others; the responses that he receives from others to his own "new" interpretations of a situation make his inventions very much a part of the total social setting. The process from the personal to the social in this matter of invention does not necessarily follow this one-way sequence in actual experience. The child never make a distinction between "what he is and what he does with the help of others"; the personal and social aspects of invention are always merged into "one series of progressive advances" in his own life experiences.<sup>50</sup> The general conclusion that Baldwin draws from these observations is that "the child is not 'either an imitator or an inventor'; on the contrary, he is always in some degree both at once."<sup>51</sup>

The two elements besides imitation and invention that Baldwin considers of significance as instruments of the socialization of the self are language and play. Baldwin considered language "the most important" of all agencies of personal growth. It is through language, he held, that "the social *Geist*, the *socius*, comes to ever-clearer and more adequate expression."<sup>52</sup> "Such functions as language, spoken and written, play

<sup>48</sup> "Invention," in *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, v. I, p. 572.

<sup>49</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 108.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 125.

<sup>51</sup> "Invention," in *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, v. I, p. 572.

<sup>52</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 147.

and art . . . are not only conveniences of life; they are necessary means of growth.”<sup>53</sup>

These statements might suggest that Baldwin saw in verbal communication the primary instrument of the socialization of the self. He was too much of an imitation theorist to take such a view. In Baldwin's self theory language is not given a prominent place and is treated merely as a function of imitation. Without imitation there can be no language. The child's “instinctive imitation of word-sounds opens a door to the entrance of word-meanings.” With his “hereditary capacity for speech, and the tendency, also hereditary, to imitate,” the child “finds himself, before he knows it, and without any necessity of understanding it, right in the midst of a most intricate network of social relationships available to him by the use of words picked up by pleasant and playful imitation.”<sup>54</sup>

The fact that Baldwin treats language as a by-product of imitation rather than as an aspect of the larger process of communication has been a point of sharp criticism. Ellwood goes so far as to say that “communication” has not been discussed at all by Baldwin. “Of course, the implication of what he says is that the process of communication is essentially one of social imitation. This is clear, for example, when he discusses language. But,” adds Ellwood, “this theory of the nature of communication would no longer be accepted today by psychologists or sociologists.”<sup>55</sup>

When Baldwin's views on language are compared with those of Charles H. Cooley, it can readily be seen why the latter's thoughts on the subject have proved more lasting. Cooley avoided the simple formula of imitation and tried to interpret language as a phase of communication. He noted in his observations of the child's mental growth that even in early stages, before the child is ready to repeat words, his mind begins to live and express itself through what Cooley called “pre-verbal” communication. This is communication through the means of facial expressions, gestures, or the tone of the voice, and these signs are “interpreted by children long before they learn to speak.” The child's communication with others at the verbal level does not begin with his

<sup>53</sup> *History of Psychology*, v. II, p. 130.

<sup>54</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 139-40.

<sup>55</sup> Ellwood, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

imitation of word sounds. "Nearly every child," adds Cooley, "starts in to invent a language for himself, and only desists when he finds that there is one all ready-made for him."<sup>56</sup> To Cooley imitation and the use of language imply an already existing mental activity which has its origin in the communicative urge of man.

Baldwin saw in play another mechanism for the socializing of the individual which in importance ranks next to language. His theory of play is based on the doctrine of recapitulation and is very similar, in this respect, to the position advocated by G. Stanley Hall. Baldwin considers play, both in its organic and social aspects, a mechanism that "has arisen to afford a sort of artificial recapitulation of the serious and strenuous exertions of race progress,"<sup>57</sup> and to provide the child with a means to prepare himself for adult social life. Imitative learning and invention operate in the games of children and it is play that transforms the young fully into social beings. "Many of the organizations of developed society are exemplified in the spontaneous play-organizations [of children]."<sup>58</sup>

Psychologically, play is the product of a "native impulse" or "instinct" which man possesses in common with other higher animals, according to Baldwin. The fact that animals also exhibit play activities is taken as an indication that in the course of evolution these activities have developed to aid the organism in the struggle for existence. Play supplies the kind of schooling that is necessary as preparation for that struggle. On the human level competition and struggle being of social as well as of biological character, the child has to prepare for a life that is far more complex than that of the animal world. The operation of the play "instinct" in the child leads to varied forms instead of to the kind of stereotyped behavior that one notes in animals. Although Baldwin speaks of an instinct of play, he uses the term in the sense of an innate drive and is careful to repeat that in man instincts do not lead to predetermined patterns of behavior. He notes that in the evolution of man only those mechanisms of behavior survive that do not interfere with the growth of social life. "Plasticity is the rule of social life, and its requirement; the opposite is the condition represented by animal instinct."<sup>59</sup>

The impulses to certain forms of action, such as play, and the emo-

<sup>56</sup> Charles H. Cooley, *Social Organization* (1909), pp. 66, 68.

<sup>57</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 149. <sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 156.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 202.

tional responses that man has in common with other animals are the two points that, in the opinion of Baldwin, support the theory of recapitulation. His analysis of bashfulness illustrates the argument. Baldwin observed that the child's early experiences of bashfulness gradually change to experiences of modesty, and he interpreted this as a clear case of the repetition of stages through which the human race has evolved. Bashfulness is a differentiated form of animal fear. As the child develops social consciousness, his bashfulness becomes reflective and changes into modesty.<sup>80</sup> In these interpretations Baldwin was following observations that had already been made by Darwin and later evolutionists. That the development, physical as well as mental, that the child goes through, recapitulates the series of stages that mark the growth of animals is a view that in Baldwin's day had pretty wide currency. Baldwin felt, however, that the evolutionists, with few exceptions, had neglected the social implications of the recapitulation doctrine. He held that in the child's growth one sees repeated not only the stages of animal evolution, but also a repetition of the stages of mental development of the human race, from the primitive to the highest or ethical level. This view holds a large place in Baldwin's theory of social evolution and progress, and will be considered fully in the chapter dealing with that subject.

In his interpretation of play in terms of recapitulation, Baldwin shows a tendency toward analogical reasoning that is also evident in many other phases of his social theory. He was critical of this mode of reasoning whenever he noted it in other thinkers, without realizing that some of his own views were open to attack on the same ground. Herbert Spencer's explanation of play in terms of surplus energy was not satisfactory to Baldwin because it suggested a narrow physical analogy; but, what was Baldwin's own theory of play if not the product of a biological analogy? He found play to be recapitulatory in the same sense as the biological growth of the individual; both developments represented, in his opinion, simply a case of "ontogeny repeating phylogeny." In an evaluation of Spencer's scientific method, Baldwin makes this observation: "It has always seemed to me that Mr. Spencer was a great example of

<sup>80</sup> *Mental Development*, pp. 139-49. Also, *Social and Ethical Development*, pp. 204-29. (Incidentally, Baldwin remarks in this connection that some of these views are the result of an analysis of his own personality which he describes as "a victim of a very sensitive social sense"—p. 213.)

the costliness of analogy. Analogy, analogy everywhere! It is not a part of the interconnection of the sciences that the facts of one should be explained by analogies from another; yet such a procedure Spencer constantly falls into." <sup>61</sup> This criticism may be applied with equal justification to Baldwin's own speculations, particularly to his theory of play.

The recapitulation theory of play has no advocates today among students of the subject. One of the chief criticisms of the view has been that it rests on the naive assumption of the existence of uniform and well-marked cultural epochs in the development of all societies, and also on the belief that there is a sharp difference between the mind of the primitive man and that of the civilized individual. It should be pointed out, furthermore, that the play activities of children in various societies are marked not so much by uniformity but by differences that reflect particular environmental and cultural factors.

We have tried to sketch in this chapter Baldwin's views in regard to the nature of the social self and his treatment of imitation, language, and play as factors in the development of the individual. It is in the study of the growth of the self that Baldwin discovered the key to an understanding of society. His theories of social organization rest on the belief that its forms and direction are repeated or anticipated in the life of the child. An analysis and interpretation of those theories will now be attempted.

<sup>61</sup> *Fragments in Philosophy and Science*, p. 356.

### *Chapter Three*

## *SOCIETY: ITS ORGANIZATION AND INSTITUTIONS*

ONCE it is appreciated that the individual and society are the two aspects of a whole, rather than two separate and opposed categories, "the main barrier to the successful understanding of society is removed."<sup>1</sup> This was Baldwin's reaction to the individualistic and atomistic theories of society still championed by many thinkers of his day. The individual and the group are in a constantly moving reciprocal, give-and-take relationship, and the life of one is clearly reflected in the life of the other. Baldwin's social theory is built upon this basic assumption. It was natural that as a psychologist his interest should have been directed first to the individual. He soon discovered that the behavior of the individual can be subjected to meaningful study only when viewed in its true character as social behavior. "The individual mind, as dealt with by the psychologist, is not a cell closed to influences from the group; far from it. The psychologist reports the individual as in substance a microcosm reflecting the group life in miniature."<sup>2</sup> This is precisely what Baldwin did. He began with the study of the individual mind and its development, and discovered society reflected in the life of the child.

If the individual and society are merely the aspects of a whole rather than independent entities, it follows, reasoned Baldwin, that the stages that mark the development of the individual are also present in the growth and organization of society. Baldwin found further support for this contention, it was noted earlier, in the doctrine of recapitulation. There is a "repetition of phylogenesis in ontogenesis,"<sup>3</sup> he noted, not only in a biological but also in a psychological sense. In other words,

<sup>1</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 97.

<sup>2</sup> *Mental Development*, p. 13.

<sup>3</sup> *Individual and Society*, p. 14.

in the mental development of the child one finds repeated the stages of the growth of society.

In Baldwin's view the individual does not become fully a member of his group until he develops social consciousness. Society, in turn, comes into being only when the relations of individuals with each other reach a conscious level. Where "normal conscious relations" between individuals do not exist (e. g. among the insane, animals ruled by instinct, persons who do not understand one another's language, or "among those who have no interests in common"), says Baldwin, "society simply does not exist and cannot be constituted in such conditions. The essential bond is lacking, *the mental bond*, the common thought, and the common apprehension of personality."<sup>4</sup> Social relationship means conscious relationship to Baldwin. "The social relation is in all cases *intrinsic to the life, interests, and purposes of the individual*; he feels and apprehends the vitality of social relations in all the situations of his life. On the side of sociology, too, this truth is of no less importance. Every social situation is constituted by the thinking and acting of certain individuals, in varying degrees and sorts of cooperation or opposition constituting the social relationship."<sup>5</sup>

All sociological theories which fail to recognize the dependence of social relations upon mental factors are worthless or misleading, according to Baldwin. It is futile to attempt to explain the social bond in terms of geographic, biological, physical, mechanical, or other such factors. These are factors that merely condition or affect the social process. For a real understanding and explanation of society one should turn to the psychological relations between individuals.

The inner and external aspects of social relations are expressed by the terms of "community" and "solidarity." Baldwin uses the term solidarity to describe "the objective or external manifestations of the relations subsisting in a group or society," and the term community to suggest "the sense of this mutuality and commonness of knowledge and action, in the minds of the individuals concerned."<sup>6</sup> Sociology is concerned mainly, in his opinion, with the phenomena of "solidarity," while social psychology is interested in the "community" aspects of relations. A thor-

<sup>4</sup> *Individual and Society*, p. 30.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

ough study of social life should include both of these two approaches.

The elements of community and solidarity in the group reveal themselves fully when society reaches its highest stage of development. The process of this development is, to Baldwin, a dialectic of social growth, analogous to the dialectic of personal growth.

Coming to make the analogy in more detail, we see that society stands as a quasi-personality under a twofold relation of give-and-take to the individuals who make up the social group. It is related to these individuals in two ways: first, as having itself become what it is by the absorption of the thoughts, struggles, sentiments, cooperations, etc., of individuals; and second, as itself finding its new lessons in personal (*now social*) growth in the new achievements of individuals. If we take any lesson which society learns—any one thought which it adopts and makes a part of its organized content,—we can trace the passage of this thought or element through the two poles of the “dialectic of social growth,” just as we can also trace the elements of personal suggestion, in the case of the analogous dialectic of the individual’s growth.<sup>7</sup>

We have already noted, in the last chapter, the three stages of personal growth—projective, subjective, and ejective. Baldwin holds that these stages also mark the process through which the individual’s thoughts become part of the social fabric. Such thoughts are considered “projective” to society while they remain in the minds of individuals; when they are expressed, imitated, and embodied into social institutions, they become “subjective”; and finally thoughts reach the “ejective” stage when they get translated into social sanctions.

Reduced to more intelligible language, the dialectic of social growth means this: Thoughts are the real matter of social organization, as such organization rests upon a conscious relationship between individuals; thoughts originate in the minds of individuals; through imitation individual thoughts become the thoughts of the group, its social heritage, which, in turn, supplies the material for new thoughts. The whole is a give-and-take process. The individual, through his inventions or his

<sup>7</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 540-41.

own interpretations of what he finds in the social heritage, acts as a "particularizing social force"; the group, on the other hand, acts as a "generalizing social force"<sup>8</sup> in the sense that, through imitation, it takes the individual inventions or new thoughts and makes them part of society.

Baldwin, resorting once again to analogical reasoning, writes:

Society makes her particularizations, inventions, interpretations, through the individual man, just as the individual makes his through the alter individual who gives him his suggestions; and then society makes her generalizations by setting the results thus reached to work again for herself in the form of institutions, etc., just as the individual sets out for social confirmation and for conduct the interpretations which he has reached. The growth of society is therefore a growth *in a sort of self-consciousness—an awareness of itself*—expressed in the general ways of thought, action, etc., embodied in its institutions; and the individual gets his growth in self-consciousness in a way which shows by a sort of recapitulation this two-fold movement of society. So the method of growth in the two cases—what has been called the "dialectic"—is the same.<sup>9</sup>

Although at times Baldwin has held that a group self existing independently above and beyond the relationship between individual minds is not possible, here he speaks of society developing "self-consciousness" or "an awareness of itself." Baldwin was too confirmed an idealist in his philosophy to be able to deny the existence of a "social self." Furthermore, to deny this would prove disturbing to the neat parallel which he built between individual and social growth. In this connection, Baldwin's own explanation of his position is of particular interest:

Whether we hold that there is a "real" general or social self seems to me to depend very much upon our metaphysical presuppositions. If we mean by a "real" self a something back of the processes of growth and not expressed in the content of thought, then there is no reason for saying that there is a "real" social self. If, however, our meaning in speaking of a self be exhausted by just the thought-con-

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 537.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 541-42.

text with its organization and growth, then society may have a "real" self just as the individual has. Indeed, if a metaphysician should find it well to say on the strength of the analogous "dialectic" that there must be hovering over society an "I" consciousness which integrates all the "me" consciousnesses of the individuals, I think the contrast between the ideal "I" and the habitual "me," in the individual, would be in so far an available analogy.<sup>10</sup>

Using the dialectic pattern of individual mental growth again as his guide, Baldwin drew a picture of the evolutionary development of social organization. This development, in his view, is marked by three stages, each stage revealing a unique form of solidarity.<sup>11</sup> The main stages of social organization are: (1) the instinctive or gregarious; (2) the spontaneous or plastic; and (3) the reflective or social proper.

The first stage of organization is the result of a type of behavior that is essentially biological in character. It is the kind of organization that one observes in certain animal groups. The habits that enable individuals to live together in this early form of group life are not socially acquired habits, but habits that spring directly from instincts. They are primarily the result of the instinct of gregariousness which does not require a sense of "psychic community" for its operation. Gregariousness is a matter of purely biological reactions at this level of development. The solidarity suggested by gregarious behavior is merely an external characteristic, and the grouping that results from the relationship of gregarious individuals can not be considered social in any real sense. Theories that attempt to explain social organization in terms of an instinct of gregariousness are considered inadequate by Baldwin because human society has evolved to a level where it is no longer governed merely by such instincts.

The second stage of organization is marked by the rise of spontaneous or plastic forms of behavior. Group behavior in this case is the result of habits that are learned and not merely the products of biological inheritance. It is more meaningful to speak of the operation of impulses rather

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 541.

<sup>11</sup> *Individual and Society*, pp. 35-52; *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 254-55; also, "The Basis of Social Solidarity" in *American Journal of Sociology*, v. XV (May, 1910), pp. 817-31.

than that of instincts, at this level. The spontaneous stage "follows simply from the social impulse itself, considered as a tendency to co-operative action, which arises out of earlier social instincts."<sup>12</sup> It is at this stage of development that the social impulse of imitation comes to the surface. The main points that distinguish the second stage from the first are the following: (a) The "modes of collective action illustrate social transmission rather than physical heredity." The mechanism of imitation comes into play here, and we find the emergence of the psychological factors in the phenomenon of association. The plastic biological equipment of the individual at this level makes possible, through imitation, the learning of new modes of behavior that lead to group life. (b) As "the individual grows into the tradition of the group," we find that his plasticity and ability to learn serve merely as a means to "conformity, conservation, stability, and solidarity." In other words, group solidarity reigns supreme at this stage, and plasticity only describes the behavior of the individual. (c) The mode of solidarity we find here is essentially a psychological solidarity as distinguished from the biological solidarity resulting from purely instinctive behavior that characterizes the first stage.<sup>13</sup>

The third and final stage is marked by the kind of group organization that may be called reflective or social proper. Relations between individuals at this stage are considered to be reflective and truly social by Baldwin because they are, on the whole, conscious relations. While at the second stage of social organization the individual was found to be plastic in the sense that he could be thoroughly moulded and dominated by the group, at the highest stage of organization he shows the ability, for the first time, to cooperate intentionally and voluntarily with his fellow men, "in the pursuit of intelligent ends." The solidarity that the group now exhibits is a social solidarity, as compared with the biological and psychological solidarity that are characteristic of the first and second stages respectively. At the highest level the individual is no longer moved merely by responses to social suggestion; his behavior now begins to be guided by "intelligent judgment."

The distinguishing characteristics of the highest stage of all social

<sup>12</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 254.

<sup>13</sup> *Individual and Society*, pp. 41-44.

organization are further set forth by Baldwin in the following points: (a) "Intelligent acts of cooperation cannot be considered as due to either physical or social heredity . . . They are social novelties." They represent modes of individual behavior that are marked by deviation from the accepted traditions of the group. They express a reaction, or even a revolt, against the solidarity of the group. (b) The new social solidarity that emerges as a result of such reaction is a "solidarity of intelligence," as distinguished from the earlier forms of solidarity based on instinct or feeling. Animals are held together by instinct; the cohesive bond in human crowds is feeling; in a truly human society, however, the social bond springs from an internal organization of intelligence. Social organization is dependent upon the consciousness and awareness of individuals of their place and function in the group. (c) Social organization, conceived in these terms, represents a stage that has its parallel in the full development of the individual self. The growth of the "ego" leads to the recognition of the social "alter" and to the establishment of conscious relationship between the two. The solidarity that results from this is one of voluntary and conscious cooperation. (d) Neither biological factors of instinct, nor the psychological factors of feeling and emotion are the real determinants of social life. Intelligence is the only specific psychological factor that gives rise to the "social and reflective mode of collective life." A truly social organization rests upon the "conscious and voluntary cooperation of individuals."<sup>14</sup>

The three stages of social organization outlined above represent, in Baldwin's view, a "genetic continuity or progression." While he claims that "that which differentiates human society is the presence of reflective sociality,"<sup>15</sup> he holds, on the other hand, that the two other forms of sociality or solidarity—instinctive and plastic—may still be present in a highly evolved society. In moving to the highest level of reflective social life men do not entirely lose those instinctive and emotional tendencies and impulses that enable them to organize into groups at the lower levels of gregarious and spontaneous relationships.

We saw above that in Baldwin's view social organization in its devel-

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 45-50.

<sup>15</sup> "The Basis of Social Solidarity," in *American Journal of Sociology*, v. XV (May, 1910), p. 827.

opment passes through three stages: instinctive, spontaneous, and reflective. These three stages he had also found to mark the child's growth into a social being. The last or reflective stage of development, which to both the individual and the group is the truly social level, represents also, according to Baldwin, a mode of life that is basically ethical in character. A fully developed individual self is also an ethical self, and social organization at its highest stage is an ethical organization. The ethical development of the individual and of society is an interrelated process. This process may best be understood, Baldwin believes, by turning attention once again to the behavior of the child. In the growth of the child's ethical self he sees a recapitulation of the stages through which society moves toward an ethical order.

Baldwin tries to support this view with an account of what he considers to be the nature of the individual's emotional and intellectual development. He sees this development as a dialectic process marked again by three stages. The emotions and intelligence of the child are of impersonal character at first, soon they become personal, and finally, social. These impersonal, personal, and social phases correspond, respectively, to the projective, subjective, and ejective stages in the growth of the child's self. Baldwin never felt intellectually satisfied, it seems, until he could reduce all new phenomena to triadic schemes, harmonious with his original dialectic formula.

The intelligence that may be present at the instinctive level of personal or social development is, to Baldwin, of an *impersonal* type. Intelligence is considered to be of impersonal character also at the "projective" stage of the child's growth when he becomes aware of others before he is able to distinguish between them and himself. As the child grows and begins to imitate, he develops a sense of himself as distinguished from other individuals. This "subjective" stage in the dialectic process is marked by the first indications of a *personal* element in the child's thinking. Impersonal intelligence gives way to personal intelligence. *Social* intelligence emerges when the child reaches the "ejective" stage and begins to recognize others as like himself. Social intelligence, in this sense, suggests a higher form of relationship than the one associated with personal intelligence. This new level of development Baldwin considers not only truly social but also ethical in character.

Baldwin claims that the ethical or moral sense in the child begins to appear when he finds himself unable to meet new situations in terms of habitual or accommodative behavior. The "oughts" and "ought nots" that the child hears from the people around him call for a new kind of response. The child learns to obey, and as he obeys he develops a sense of obligation. It is through this sense of obligation that the individual grows into an ethical self. Baldwin makes the social and the ethical equivalent concepts. In their growth into the highest or social stage both the individual and the group become ethical. "Society, we may say," writes Baldwin, "is the form of natural organization which ethical personalities come into in their growth. So also, on the side of the individual, we may define ethical personality as the form of natural development which individuals grow into who live in social relationships."<sup>16</sup> The reciprocal character of the relationship between the individual and society on the ethical level is explained by Baldwin in these words: 'Ethical phenomena are phenomena of organization,—that is, in their origin,—and the solidarity of the results, the apparent universality of ethical sentiment, is due to the fact that this sentiment is a thing of common and united attainment. It is in society because it is in all the individuals; but it is in each individual because it is already in society. It is one of those genetic circles by which nature so often works out her development problems.'<sup>17</sup> A significant reaction to this position is that of Jean Piaget who says: "Such a proposition seems either a truism or a superficial account of the matter. But if we remember Baldwin's profound treatment of the development of the self as bound up with life in common, we cannot but recognize the value of the above formula. For in the adult's own life the moral sentiments remain closely dependent upon the opinions of others."<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 571.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 313.

<sup>18</sup> Jean Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (New York, 1932), p. 395. It should be noted that although Piaget saw much of value in Baldwin's theory of the self, he shared the view of nearly all critics of that theory that imitation is its weakest point. "One can hardly deny, indeed, after reading [Baldwin's] analysis," writes Piaget, "that the self can only know itself in reference to other selves. But imitation will never enable us to perceive in ourselves anything but what we have in common with others. In order to discover oneself as a particular individual, what is needed is a continuous comparison, the outcome of opposition, of discussion, and of mutual control; and indeed consciousness of the individual self appears far later than consciousness of the more general features in

Baldwin's formula is of some value, no doubt, as a statement of the fact that the individual's moral judgments reflect the ethical values of society. But his contention that the social self is nothing but an ethical self in its origin and growth is open to question. This view, incidentally, has also been suggested, in less rigid form, in Cooley's theory of primary group ideals. "The ideal that grows up in familiar association," says Cooley, "may be said to be a part of human nature itself. In its most general form it is that of a moral whole or community wherein individual minds are merged and the higher capacities of the members find total and adequate expression. And it grows up because familiar association fills our minds with imaginations of the thought and feeling of other members of the group, and of the group as a whole, so that, for many purposes, we really make them a part of ourselves and identify our self-feeling with them."<sup>19</sup> What Cooley maintains, in effect, is that the individual's social self emerging from primary associations is also basically a moral self. In the systems of both Baldwin and Cooley the social and the ethical are closely linked, one might even say interchangeable, concepts. But in fairness to Cooley it must be admitted that his views on this matter are free of the dogmatism so characteristic of Baldwin's thoughts. The latter's desire to fit the subject into a recapitulation framework resulted in a picture of the ethical self which is quite different from that of Cooley. While in Cooley's view the moral values of the individual are merely the product of early social interaction, to Baldwin they are, in addition to this factor, the result of the gradual unfolding of some inherent capacity in the individual for ethical behavior. This is evident in Baldwin's conception of the development of intelligence as a growth culminating in the social and ethical stage.

Baldwin's view of society as an ethical whole is revealed more clearly in his speculations in regard to the nature of the criminal and the genius. These will be considered briefly at this point.

We have already noted that in Baldwin's opinion relations in the group acquire an ethical character when the individuals develop a social

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our psychological make-up. This is why a child can remain egocentric for a very long time (through lack of consciousness of self) while participating on all points in the minds of others . . . Consciousness of self therefore is both a product and a condition of co-operation." (pp. 399-400.)

<sup>19</sup> Charles H. Cooley, *Social Organization* (New York, 1909), p. 33.

type of intelligence. This intelligence, Baldwin goes on to say, expresses itself most significantly in individual "judgments." The kind of "social spirit" or sense of belonging that one develops in his own particular group is best understood by considering the nature of personal judgments. The individual's judgments reflect the judgments of the group. The person whose life-values are in harmony with the values of the community is, to Baldwin, a man of "good judgment." "So we reach the general position that the eligible candidate for social life must have good judgment as represented by the common standards of judgment of his people."<sup>20</sup> The "average man" or the "normal *socius*" is defined by Baldwin as "a person *who learns to judge by the judgments of society*." The criminal and the genius represent "variations." "The criminal is, socially considered, a man of poor judgment," and the genius is one who is endowed with "extraordinary sanity of social judgment."<sup>21</sup>

Baldwin's classification of criminal "types" is very similar to that of Enrico Ferri. There are three main categories of criminals, according to Baldwin: the "born criminal" who is driven to his acts by instinct alone; the "occasional criminal" who is motivated by passion resulting from suggestion or imitation; and, finally, the "deliberate criminal" whose acts are reflective and voluntary—"properly speaking, this is the real criminal, the social criminal."<sup>22</sup> Baldwin believes that crime must be studied from the point of view of motivation rather than on the basis of its results. He considers the existing sociological studies of crime as inadequate because they fail to take into account the psychological differences suggested by the three types in his classification of criminals. "There is no general or purely sociological definition of crime," he concludes, "that will serve as basis for practical punishment or social reform."<sup>23</sup>

Baldwin advocates the "social suppression of the unfit" as a cure of crime and other problems of society. "In organic evolution we have the natural selection of the fit; in social progress we have the social suppression of the unfit."<sup>24</sup> By "unfit" he means those who are not able to "learn" to be social. There is a suggestion here that the individual's abil-

<sup>20</sup> *Story of the Mind*, p. 209.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 210, 214, and 226.

<sup>22</sup> *Individual and Society*, p. 59.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 60.

<sup>24</sup> *Story of the Mind*, p. 204.

ity to become social is fixed by his physical heredity. Baldwin says: "However we may limit the influence of physical transmission and emphasize that of social transmission, yet the great fact that men are born dissimilar, mentally and morally as well as physically, must have a place in all theories of social life."<sup>25</sup> This statement supplies a good illustration of the careless and inconsistent reasoning that is behind many of Baldwin's formulations. He insists, on the one hand, that the individual's moral sense is a social product, yet asserts, on the other, that "men are born dissimilar . . . morally." Baldwin considers the criminal a "variation" because such an individual lacks the inborn equipment of the normal human to grow into a moral being. While the normal or average individual is capable of appreciating and judging the values of right and wrong in society, "the socially unfit person is the person of poor judgment."<sup>26</sup> It never occurred to Baldwin, it seems, that the criminal may be a person of excellent judgment as far as the values of his own particular group are concerned. Since Baldwin takes all truly social behavior to be ethical behavior, it is difficult for him to accept the fact that the actions of the criminal are also social in origin and growth. That Baldwin regards anti-social acts as outside the realm of the social is indicated in the following remark: "Man is a social outcome rather than a social unit. He is always, in his greatest part, also some one else. Social acts of his—that is, acts which may not prove anti-social—are his because they are society's first; otherwise he would not have learned them nor have had any tendency to do them."<sup>27</sup> This means, in effect, that only the social acts of the individual can be traced back to society. Anti-social acts spring from within those persons who are innately unfit for life in a moral, social order.

In his social-psychological studies Baldwin lost no opportunity to point out that innate and acquired characteristics in man are merely the two aspects of a single developmental process and cannot be studied as isolated factors. But in the field of social problems, such as crime, the moralist in Baldwin was too strong to let him see matters in that light. His views on the criminal, far from being social interpretations of the subject, are largely a reflection of the popular dogma of individual re-

<sup>25</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 91.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 96.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 95.

sponsibility. In Baldwin's scheme not only the "born criminal," but also the "social criminal" is a born type. The "social criminal" is by physical heredity a morally low type whose judgments of social values are pre-destined to be "poor judgments."

A few words now on Baldwin's interpretation of the genius. Baldwin's definition of the average man is, to repeat, "a person who learns to judge by the judgments of society." The genius, like the criminal, represents a "variation" from the average. The characteristics that mark the man of genius as one above the level of the average are his "intellectual originality" and the "sanity of his judgment."<sup>28</sup> The genius differs from others in innate equipment, but he is at the same time as much a product of the social heritage as any other individual. While in the case of the criminal Baldwin places great emphasis on inborn traits, in the case of the genius he disagrees sharply with such theorists as Cesare Lombroso who attempt to identify the man of genius, as well as the criminal, in terms of physical characteristics alone. Such a view disregards, Baldwin points out, the basically social nature of the development of the genius and the fact that his inventions are "always rooted in the knowledge already possessed by society."<sup>29</sup> In his treatment of the criminal Baldwin adopts an almost Lombrosian point of view, but when he turns to the genius he finds that approach inadequate and misleading. While the genius is primarily a social product, the criminal is not. Since Baldwin conceives of society as an ethical organization, the criminal cannot be regarded as the product of such a social order. The genius, on the other hand, not only is a product of society and fully shares its values, but, in turn, through his inventive activity contributes to the further progress of the group.

The genius is a person with "extraordinary sanity of social judgment." What Baldwin means is that the genius is one who understands his society well enough to make the kind of contributions that can become part of its heritage. While it is admitted that the thoughts of the genius represent variations from the average thought of the group, this does not mean that his judgments differ sharply from those of society. In order that the new thoughts or inventions contributed by the genius be imitated and adopted by the group, these new thoughts must have the

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 174.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 180.

quality of "fitness." It is the sanity of his judgment that enables the genius to make the kind of contributions that will fit into or will be in harmony with the established traditions of the group.

Baldwin considers the genius an important factor in social change. "The inventions of the genius are the nuclei of social habit," he claims, and "the loci of social accommodation."<sup>80</sup> In other words, all the traditions and institutions of society are the result of the inventions and germinal ideas of the past, and the genius has been a chief contributor to the enrichment of the group's social heritage. Society tries to conserve this heritage which lives in social habits formed by imitation. But, changes constantly occur that force the group to make new adaptations and new accommodations. These changes within the group may be caused by changes in the physical environment. More often, they are changes that are caused by the inventions of the genius. Thus, the genius not only initiates the habits of the group, but also creates, through his inventions, the grounds for new accommodations. "Social heredity emphasizes imitation," concludes Baldwin, "the genius illustrates invention."<sup>81</sup>

Baldwin's view of society as an ethical organization is closely related to his concepts of social sanctions and institutions. He believes society rests on moral foundations because, as we saw above, it is composed of individuals who in general "have good judgment as represented by the common standards of judgment" of the group. It is through judgment that the individual absorbs and makes his own the elements present in his social heritage. What he accepts as right are traditions that the group has already accepted as right, and his own individual judgment of these reflects the collective judgment of the group. The genius with his superior judgment and imagination does not merely conform to social traditions as the average man does, but he reacts with new judgments that bring change into those traditions. While the genius represents an extreme case of variation from the normal, there are many individuals who possess enough imagination to contribute their share to social change. Judgment and imagination are, to Baldwin, "the two great modes of socialization." Through judgment the individual accepts the thoughts and customs of his group; through imagination he reinter-

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 186.

<sup>81</sup> *Story of the Mind*, p. 211.

prets these and thus goes beyond the accepted and the traditional. Imagination gives rise to new individual judgments which the group, in turn, accepts and makes part of its traditions.

We have noted earlier that Baldwin considers imitation to be the chief method of socialization. But now we find him speaking of judgment and imagination as "the two great modes of socialization."<sup>32</sup> Baldwin attempts to meet the contradiction apparent here by the claim that social organization based upon judgment and imagination is on a higher level than that based on mere imitation. Imitation alone cannot explain the highest or ethical type of organization which is the most fully evolved form of society. In an ethical society interactions are guided by "social intelligence" (rather than by "personal" or imitative intelligence) which expresses itself in judgment.

Although Baldwin tried to explain both imitative and ethical behavior in terms of the unfolding of some innate capacity in the individual, in the case of the ethical he felt the need to go beyond such a simple view. What makes the individuals in an ethically organized society behave as persons of "good judgment" or "judge by the judgments of society"? To answer this question Baldwin introduces the concept of sanction.

Sanction is defined by Baldwin as "any ground or reason which is adequate to initiate action, whether the actor be conscious or not that this is the ground or reason of the resulting action."<sup>33</sup> Baldwin distinguishes between two kinds of sanctions: personal and social. Personal sanctions refer to those objects or ends in life which the individual consciously follows or obeys. Social sanctions include all influences which regulate the behavior of the person in the group, though they need not be consciously experienced by him.

As usual, Baldwin tries to approach the subject of sanctions from the genetic or developmental point of view. Taking once again the dialectic of personal growth as his guide, he catalogues personal sanctions into

<sup>32</sup> *Individual and Society*, p. 73.

<sup>33</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 370. In a later work, *The Individual and Society* (1911), Baldwin uses the terms "control" and "social control" in the same sense as sanction. It is interesting to note that in this book he presents social control as "a new notion" (p. 69). This may justly be interpreted as an indication that Baldwin was not sufficiently acquainted with the existing literature on the subject. The term had already been given wide currency in American sociology by the publication, in 1901, of E. A. Ross's *Social Control*.

three types, each corresponding to one of the stages through which the individual passes in his development into a social and ethical being. In the order of growth from the lowest to the highest level, we have the sanction of impulse, the sanction of desire, and the sanction of right. Baldwin associates the sanction of impulse with acts of necessity, the sanction of desire with acts aiming at success, and the sanction of right with all acts that are directly guided by conscience. Although all personal sanctions lead to socially approved modes of conduct, it is in the sanction of right that the highest ethical values of society find expression. When the individual reaches the ethical level, he begins to respond more to the sanction of right than to the sanctions of impulse and desire. The lower sanctions have to yield to the sanction of right when duty becomes the guiding force in the individual's conduct.<sup>84</sup>

Turning from personal to social sanctions we find the latter defined by Baldwin as "those reasons for action which bear in upon the individual from the social environment."<sup>85</sup> It may be remarked that this definition could be applied also to personal sanctions. As a matter of fact, Baldwin is careful to point out that the distinction between personal and social sanctions should not be carried too far. In most cases, "the social reference of the action is as natural to the individual as are his private references, and the sanction is one."<sup>86</sup> Baldwin is clearer in his distinction between social sanctions and social heredity. Social heredity shapes the personal growth of the individual, but does not define the specific modes in which social influences are to lead the individual to action; social sanctions are the forces that determine the particular courses of human behavior. To understand the nature and operation of social sanctions it is necessary to study their sources—the social institutions.

According to Baldwin, there are three major and "fundamental" institutions that exercise social sanctions: the school, the state, and the church. They are all "fundamental in the sense that they are *requisite to society*, however primitive it may be."<sup>87</sup> Baldwin defines institution as "the permanent form in which the organization of members of a group embodies itself for carrying on its social function."<sup>88</sup> The exter-

<sup>84</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 410.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 420.

<sup>87</sup> *Individual and Society*, p. 123.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 414.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 119.

nal form of an institution or the means which it employs to reach its ends are not of essential interest. A social institution should be identified in terms of the goals that give direction to the type of group interest and action present in the institution. The school, the state, and the church serve, respectively, the "cultural," "regulative," and "sentimental" interests of society.

In Baldwin's system the school is used in a broad sense, and includes all the "pedagogical and cultural institutions" that contribute to "the preparation of the individual for his social place and role."<sup>39</sup> The family, in this sense, comes under the heading of school.<sup>40</sup> It is in the family, in the classroom, and in such informal associations as the play-group that the individual is subjected to the "pedagogical" sanctions that direct his development into a social and ethical being. Of all socializing agencies the family is the most important. It is in the family circle that one first develops that sense of oneness with the group which expresses itself in *esprit de corps*. The *esprit de corps* is the basic characteristic of all the social sanctions associated with the family. These sanctions are at the root of the social bond that holds the members of the larger group, the community, together. They are the forces, Baldwin believes, that can lead the individual to consider himself a member of the larger society or to be conscious of belonging to a "universal brotherhood."<sup>41</sup>

The state and the sanctions exerted by government constitute another set of important agencies of socialization. The state controls the individual by the exercise of constraint. To Baldwin constraint is not an essential force in social organization. Constraint implies, in his opinion, an already existing social relationship; it is a by-product rather than a cause of the social bond. It is merely an awareness of the need of restricting the anti-social behavior of certain individuals that brings forth con-

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 120.

<sup>40</sup> In *The Individual and Society* (1911) Baldwin treats the family as part of "the school," but in his *Social and Ethical Interpretations* (1897) the family is presented as a "natural" institution as distinguished from "pedagogical and conventional" institutions. Baldwin's original classification of institutions has the following headings: (1) Natural, (2) Pedagogical and Conventional, (3) Civil, and (4) Religious. "Natural" institutions are defined as "those sorts of social organizations which arise directly out of the nature of man." (pp. 415-16). Baldwin decided, evidently, in his later discussion of the subject that since his other institutions are also "natural" there is no point in continuing to make the distinction.

<sup>41</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 416-17.

straints and their application. The element of constraint in government varies according to the degree to which a group has evolved. In primitive societies government by constraint is all-powerful and dominant. But as society moves to the level of democracy and representative government, individuals become more "reflective" in their attitude and constraint begins to express the will of the governed.

Baldwin draws a distinction between the school and the state from the point of view of "the relation of the individualistic to the collectivistic motive in society."<sup>42</sup> While it is the job of institutions such as the school and the family to serve the interests of the individual, the main function of the state is to protect the group "against the undue operation of the individualistic factor . . . Educational institutions establish and foster social life, governmental institutions regulate and control it."<sup>43</sup> This view leads Baldwin to make some perfunctory observations on socialism. The movement represents, in his opinion, a protest against the institution of government rather than a working theory of society. Socialism is to him a Utopian program based on the belief that education alone is sufficient to develop individuals who, free of competition and inequality, may live collectively without the need of governmental sanctions. As an ideal, socialism "merges in that of pure democracy; but as a fact it would seem to fit only upon a Utopia of dormant contentedness and lifeless mediocrity."<sup>44</sup>

In spite of the difference that Baldwin finds between the school and the state from the point of view of their immediate functions, he regards both of these institutions as primarily "utilitarian" in character. They are utilitarian in the sense that they are necessary agencies for the development of "good citizenship." There is a suggestion here of conscious purpose and design in the activities of the school and the state. What Baldwin seems to maintain is that since these institutions have a utility value in society, their growth can be explained as the result of utilitarian motives in man.

In contrast with the school and the state, the church is to Baldwin a non-utilitarian institution. He sees religious institutions as non-utilitarian agencies in society that give direction to the mental and spiritual

<sup>42</sup> *Individual and Society*, p. 122.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 133-34.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 121.

aspirations of individuals. Society is not only the source of traditions and laws, but also of moral values. As we noted earlier, Baldwin considers a fully evolved society to be an organization of ethical character. In such a society the individual also is an ethical being who regards as "right" what the group has already accepted as right. His own sense of morality represents the individual counterpart of social morality. The particular function of religious institutions is to conserve and transmit the values of the group's morality, and also to enable the individual to identify himself with the highest ethical ideals of society.

The church as a distinct institution emerges in highly evolved societies. Baldwin notes that in groups at a primitive level the church and the state are closely identified, and that such "early form of social life may be described as politico-religious." As society evolves, the two institutions gradually become "differentiated with the growth of individualism." When the differentiation is complete, we find the religious institutions appealing to purely "emotional motives" in the individual, and the political to "strictly utilitarian motives." "One, the religious, depicts the organization of sentiment in the constitution of society; the other, the political, the organization of action."<sup>45</sup>

Baldwin saw in art another "institution of sentiment" which may be considered as important as that of religion. To him both art and religion are non-utilitarian institutions—they "may be called 'luxuries' of life"—because "they do not seek justification in practical utility or direct advantage," but serve to satisfy "the demand of the individual for a full and complete personal life." Since the operations of these non-utilitarian institutions are so closely related to personal motives and experiences, "they cannot be understood by the methods of external sociological observation," concludes Baldwin. He holds that an adequate picture of such phenomena can be obtained only through the combined efforts of sociology and psychology.<sup>46</sup>

To summarize, the three major types of institutions are those related to the school, the state, and the church. The school includes all those "pedagogical and cultural" institutions that have as their purpose to develop the individual into a social being and to help him find his place

<sup>45</sup> *Fragments in Philosophy and Science*, pp. 334-35.

<sup>46</sup> *Individual and Society*, pp. 142-44.

and role in the group. Secondly, there are the institutions that serve primarily the interests of the group and guard these interests against "the undue operation of the individualistic factor"; these are the institutions of government. Finally, there are the institutions that guide the "sentiments" of society; the most important of these are institutions related to the church.

Baldwin's theory of social organization reflects a point of view that was fairly dominant in the social thought of his day. This was an evolutionary view of society which was based on a unilinear conception of change, and which had its roots in Comte's formula of "three stages." Baldwin's theories of evolution and progress and their relation to Comte and others are discussed in some detail in the next chapter. The point that should be made here is that Baldwin's views on social organization follow closely the Comtean tradition in the assumption that there is a basic similarity between individual development and race development and that both follow a fixed and determined order of growth through definite stages. The theory of unilinear evolution gained much of its strength and prestige through the writings of Spencer, and its rise was aided in no small degree by the doctrine of recapitulation. The element of progress is implicit in this theory which is founded on the belief that social process is a movement toward a definite goal. This idea carries with it the point that societies have their origin in a given form of organization and that their development can be readily traced back to their starting level. Underlying all this was the assumption of a "general psychic unity of mankind." It was held that people everywhere reacted similarly to the environment and that their social development followed a gradual, uniform, and progressive course. Social institutions everywhere passed through essentially similar stages because the characteristics of the human mind which they reflected were also universal.

Anthropological research gradually brought about the collapse of this simple and pseudo-scientific theory of stages. Even in Baldwin's day students of society were beginning to question the validity of the unilinear concept of evolution. The new tendency was to regard the forms of social organization as characterized by differences reflecting place and time, rather than by uniformities. But Baldwin's views were not much affected by this new trend of thought. His dogma of stages was

rooted in psychology rather than anthropology. His evolutionary scheme of social organization was infused with a logical orderliness that he had discovered in the growth of the self. The life of society and its institutions were determined, in his view, by an unfolding of psychological forces alone. His picture of social organizations and institutions often conveys the impression that they are units grown in an environmental void.

This may be illustrated by recalling a point that Baldwin makes in his discussion of the state. In primitive societies, he notes, government by constraint is all-powerful, but in societies that have evolved to the level of democracy constraint expresses the will of "reflective" individuals. What Baldwin has in mind here is the difference between the kind of constraint that is exercised by custom and the kind that is imposed by law. The weakness of his view lies in the fact that he makes the more evolved stage of government a result of the rise of "reflective" minds. He does not take into account the difference between the type of relationship that operates in primitive groups and the type that is characteristic of a highly evolved society. He fails to see that in the latter case relations are of an impersonal nature, rather than of the face-to-face variety, and that it is this fact that makes controls by custom give way to constraint by law.<sup>47</sup>

Although the outworn concept of stages is the dominant feature in Baldwin's theory of social organization, his interpretations of society and its changes have not been based wholly on that formula. We have seen that Baldwin gives a large place to invention and imitation as factors in the growth of social life. In his system inventions refer primarily to those new thoughts of the individual that through imitation by others become a part of society. The real matter of society, Baldwin held, is thought, and social organization exists only in the conscious relationships between individuals. This view would have carried more weight as an important contribution to sociology if Baldwin had not weakened it by forcing an ethical meaning into the social.

Baldwin's invention-imitation theory suggests a view of social growth that often contradicts his conception of that growth in terms of stages. The development of social organization through predetermined and

<sup>47</sup> See R. M. MacIver, *Society* (New York, 1931), pp. 272-74.

successive stages is a process toward an ultimate objective. But the kind of change that is frequently implied in the invention-imitation scheme is a change that leads to no definite goal and follows no determined direction. Some commentators have singled out the latter of Baldwin's positions and have made much of its affinity to more recent theories of social change.

## *Chapter Four*

### **SOCIAL EVOLUTION AND PROGRESS**

**B**ALDWIN's social theory is based largely on the assumption that social evolution means progress. Being primarily a moral philosopher, Baldwin could see no clear distinction between such types of change as process, evolution, and progress. To him social process is an evolutionary growth toward a level of life where men behave as "ethical" beings. This development represents progress, and progress cannot be dissociated from social evolution.

We have already touched upon this point in connection with our discussion of Baldwin's theory of social organization. We have seen that, in his view, the stages through which society moves toward the highest level of ethical organization reflect the stages of the mental growth of the individual in a similar direction. In the present chapter we shall consider more fully Baldwin's ideas in regard to the nature of the evolutionary forces underlying this movement.

Baldwin's theory of social evolution rests on an important distinction which he draws between this type of change and biological evolution. Evolution in human society is marked by accommodation to the environment and the social transmission of the changes that result from accommodation; in the purely biological realm, on the other hand, adaptation is the rule and the resulting modifications are transmitted biologically.<sup>1</sup> Man is capable of accommodative adjustments to the environment because, unlike lower animals whose behavior is governed by instinct alone, he is guided by intelligence. This intelligence reveals itself in man's ability to imitate and to acquire and preserve the traditions of the group. But intelligence is also present in the individual's ability to respond "selectively" to his "social heredity" and it is this fact that explains accommodation.

<sup>1</sup> This distinction between adaptation and accommodation "was first made by J. Mark Baldwin," according to E. W. Burgess, "Accommodation," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, v. I, p. 403. See also, R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago, 1921), p. 663.

Baldwin believes that the whole evolutionary trend in animal life is in the direction of intelligent accommodation. The rudiments of accommodative behavior he finds in the adaptations that higher animals make to the environment. Accommodations of an imitative nature "enable them to acquire the habits and behaviour of their kind without running the risks of trial and error."<sup>2</sup> Animals who have acquired the habits of the group are protected against the crude operation of natural selection. Accommodation introduces a psychological element into the picture, and thus at higher levels of animal life evolution becomes "psychophysical evolution." Psychophysical evolution leads to social evolution "once the community of tradition is established and the fitness of the individuals secured for a life in some degree of gregarious habit . . . Progress from now on ushers in the dominance of mind in the modes of conscious organization which characterize social life and institutions."<sup>3</sup>

Social organization at its highest level represents, as we have noted earlier, a "solidarity of intelligence" based on conscious cooperation between its members. The ability of man to make intelligent accommodations to his social environment is, Baldwin holds, what makes possible the evolution of the group to the highest level of solidarity. The view that solidarity is the result of "personal cooperation" leads Baldwin to see "social 'progress' as simply the advancing organization due to the more and more conscious, deliberate and effective participating of the individual in the current social life."<sup>4</sup>

Progress, then, means cooperation, and cooperation is the result of accommodative behavior. What makes this sort of behavior possible is the plastic nature of the mind of the human being. As evolution advances, one notes a higher degree of plasticity and a greater range of accommodation to the social environment. The course of evolution in society thus becomes more and more determined by the accommodations made by individuals, and less and less dependent upon rigid biological heredity. Accommodation is a positive factor in social evolution, whereas natural selection is a negative one. Social evolution implies "a shifting of the emphasis from the physical to the mental," or from biological to

<sup>2</sup> *Development and Evolution*, p. 40.

<sup>4</sup> *Darwin and the Humanities*, p. 46.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.

"social heredity." In human society survival of the fittest means the survival of individuals whose "fitness may consist in their being plastic or 'accommodating.'"<sup>5</sup>

Baldwin finds in social heredity "the law of social evolution."<sup>6</sup> The traditions and functions of the group are learned anew by each generation and are transmitted socially. Although some degree of social heredity may be present in animal groups that exhibit gregarious activity, their behavior is still determined primarily by physical heredity. In this connection, Baldwin attacks vigorously all interpretations of "progressive evolution" that are based on the Lamarckian doctrine of the biological transmission of acquired characteristics, particularly the theory of Herbert Spencer. Baldwin is aware that other critics of such theories have also recognized the need of interpreting social evolution in social terms, but he claims that no thinker before his day has emphasized adequately the point that "new adjustments affected by the individual may set the direction of evolution without the inheritance of acquired characters."<sup>7</sup>

This thought lies at the root of Baldwin's theory of "organic selection," which he developed in cooperation with C. Lloyd Morgan and H. F. Osborn. The theory represents an effort to make more "meaningful" Darwin's principles of variation and selection from the point of view of their applicability to social evolution. Baldwin defines organic selection as "the perpetuation and development of congenital variations in consequence of individual accommodation."<sup>8</sup> His point is that in the case of man selection operates on variations that are not merely biological in origin but social as well. The individual constantly modifies his behavior through accommodations to his physical and social environment. This means that "there would be at every stage of growth *a combination of congenital characters with acquired modifications*; natural selection would fall in each case upon *this joint or correlated result*; and the organisms showing the most effective combinations would survive. *Variation plus modification*, the joint product actually present at the time the struggle comes on, *this is what selection proceeds upon*, and not . . . upon the congenital variations taken alone." Baldwin adds that

<sup>5</sup> *Development and Evolution*, pp. 42, 46.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 106.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 154.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 151.

the accommodations and modifications of the individual serve as a supplement or screen to his endowment; and in the course of time the endowment factor, by variation simply, with no resort to the actual inheritance of acquired characters, comes to its perfection. This result of the "coincidence" of modification and variation in guiding the course of evolution has been called "organic selection."<sup>9</sup>

These views point to a distinction between natural selection and selection as it operates in human society. While in the animal world natural selection leads to the survival of the biologically fit, in society those individuals are selected only who are socially fit. And, in Baldwin's estimation, one is socially fit if he has intelligence enough to accommodate himself to his social environment.

The individual's social environment is essentially an environment of thought. Accommodation to that environment is a psychological process in the main, and involves the selection only of such variations in individual thought and behavior that are not discordant with the traditions of the group. The criterion that determines the selection of ideas is primarily a social criterion. But even though the ideas that are fit for selection reflect social values, they are the result of individual variations and are the very elements that give direction to social evolution. In Baldwin's opinion, individual variations and accommodations constitute the core of the evolutionary process in society. He claims that his theory of social evolution finds support in "two principles now firmly established, that of the 'social inheritance' of social matter, without physical transmission, . . . and that of the psychological origin and propagation of social variations in the form of inventive ideas and original thoughts."<sup>10</sup>

Baldwin considers all social change as being the result of individual inventions. We have already noted, in our discussion of the development of the self, that to Baldwin inventiveness is fundamentally nothing but an expression of the unique manner in which one carries his imitations into action.<sup>11</sup> The individual's response to his social heritage is through imitation and invention. These two processes are not always separable. An element of invention exists in all imitation, since imitating

<sup>9</sup> *Darwin and the Humanities*, p. 18.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 49.

<sup>11</sup> Cf., p. 30.

involves the use of a certain degree of imagination. This is particularly true of imitation at the higher or "reflective" level of social organization.<sup>12</sup> However, it is primarily through invention that the individual is able to contribute to social change. His individual or particular way of responding to the social heritage brings changes into the established forms of that heritage. Everyone imitates what he finds in the social order, but what the individual imitates seldom results in an exact reproduction of the existing pattern of behavior. These variations in individual responses to the environment, or these inventions, are to Baldwin the "intrinsic vital processes" that cause social change.

In our discussion of Baldwin's "dialectic of social growth" we have seen that in his view such growth is characterized by the interplay of two forces: the "particularizing social force of the individual," and the "generalizing social force" of the group.<sup>13</sup> Particularizing is another word for invention, and generalizing means imitation. Baldwin contends that "only when both these conditions are fulfilled—when old social matter is particularized by an individual and then again generalized by society—can new accretions be normally made to the social content and progress be secured to the organization as a whole."<sup>14</sup>

While social change depends upon inventions and their "generalization," the rate of change is determined by the character of the novelties or inventions. New ideas have a better chance of getting absorbed into the social pattern and of changing it if they are in harmony, to some measure, with the traditions of the existing order. Ideas that call for slight changes have, in general, a better chance of being accepted by society, Baldwin thinks, than new ideas that suggest abrupt and radical modifications of the established order.

Baldwin believes that progress can be achieved only through gradual changes. It can be brought about by a "process of give and take between the individual and society by which what we may call the consciousness of the social body as a whole is built up . . . Thus the concurrent growth goes on: the individual feeds upon the current custom, science, morals of his time and group, and society feeds upon the thoughts, inventions, plans of social welfare excogitated by individuals."<sup>15</sup> To Baldwin

<sup>12</sup> *Individual and Society*, pp. 149-50.

<sup>13</sup> Cf., pp. 37-38.

<sup>14</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 538.

<sup>15</sup> *Individual and Society*, pp. 155-56.

progress simply means a movement toward a level of organization where the reciprocal relationship between society and the individual can continue on a basis of full cooperation. Neither "collectivism" nor "individualism" alone can lead to progress, he holds; "society and the individual are not two entities, two forces acting separately, two enemies making forced and grudging concessions each to the other. On the contrary, they are the two sides of a growing organic whole, in which the welfare and advance of the one minister to the welfare and progress of the other. There is but one human interest, when all is said, and this is both individual and social at once."<sup>16</sup>

Baldwin places strong emphasis on the element of cooperation as a factor contributing to the "survival" of the group. He agrees with Bagehot that as society evolves there is a gradual shift from "individual struggle" to "group struggle."<sup>17</sup> The group does not become the unit of struggle until its members recognize the value of cooperation. Co-operation leads to solidarity, and the group that has a high degree of solidarity has also for that very reason a greater chance of surviving in the struggle with other groups.

At the social level, the law of the "struggle for existence" is, according to Baldwin, far more adequate as an explanation of the struggle that goes on between groups than as an interpretation of the competition and rivalry between individuals. The groups that survive are those whose members exhibit "a tempered individualism; that is, a tendency to competition, rivalry, self-assertion for personal advancement, tempered by the requirements of the group life as a whole."<sup>18</sup> The more conscious an individual is of these requirements the more ethical his motives and behavior are likely to be. Baldwin sees no justification for the Huxleian view that there is no room for moral principles in the struggle for existence. The mistake here, he thinks, is the result of failure to distinguish between physical and social fitness, or between biological struggle and social rivalry. "So soon as we see that the fitness of the group for its struggle requires organization within the group, and this in turn requires a socialized rather than an egoistic individual, then the difficulty disappears. Utility for the group presupposes self-

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 170.

<sup>17</sup> *Darwin and the Humanities*, p. 45.

<sup>18</sup> *Individual and Society*, pp. 85-86.

control and altruism in the individual . . . Morality has arisen because it is socially useful."<sup>19</sup>

Neither "over-socialization" nor "over-individualism" can be helpful to the welfare or survival of the group. The kind of society where "collectivistic regulations" are dominant and where the individual is allowed no free exercise of his personality represents a type of group life that has not as yet reached full growth. It represents a level of social organization whose solidarity is the result of merely suggestion and imitation —a level-intermediate to the instinctive and reflective stages on Baldwin's evolutionary scale. "Over-individualism" is also harmful in the sense that it weakens the solidarity of the whole group. The urge to achieve status underlies the inclination of some individuals to identify themselves with such groups as social classes or political parties whose interests may not be those of the larger society. The higher and inclusive forms of community interests are to be found in "morality, religion, and art." These are the forces that create the solidarity of the group as a whole.<sup>20</sup>

Even though Baldwin sees progress as inherent in the social process, he does not always regard change toward the better as a movement operating automatically and without design. He believes that it is within the power of the group to hasten such change. Progress may be directed and accelerated through the conscious and intelligent efforts of man.<sup>21</sup> Translated into practical terms progress to Baldwin means, among other things, the effort to eliminate war, the struggle against disease, and the application of the principles of eugenics. It may be of interest to note here that Baldwin considers eugenics a movement "destined to do more for humanity . . . than possibly any other that society has seen."<sup>22</sup> Baldwin's "practical conclusions" in regard to progress, when presented as guides to the world of business, merely echo the opinions current in his day. The assumption that individual inventive behavior is a *sine qua non* of progress leads Baldwin to think that in the com-

<sup>19</sup> *Darwin and the Humanities*, pp. 61-62. <sup>20</sup> *Individual and Society*, pp. 86-95.

<sup>21</sup> Harry E. Barnes notes in this connection that Baldwin "gives at least moderate approval of Lester F. Ward's notion of social telesis." "Some Contributions of American Psychology to Modern Social and Political Theory," in *Sociological Review*, v. XIII (1921), p. 209.

<sup>22</sup> *Individual and Society*, p. 166.

mercial field "there must be left a certain freedom of initiation, a range of invention and spontaneous struggle for profits, to stimulate the individual to his best effort. This will then result in the progress and welfare of society as a whole."<sup>23</sup> That Baldwin finds in business competition an essential ingredient of social progress is not surprising when viewed in the light of his theory of rivalry.

Baldwin classifies rivalry into three major types: biological, personal, and commercial or economic.<sup>24</sup> Biological rivalry, as distinguished from the other two types which he calls social rivalry, "is the means of selection for purposes of life in a physical and vital environment; its conditions are those of the organic order; its qualifications those of physical fitness. Social rivalry, on the other hand, is the means of selection for mental and moral purposes, personal, economic, etc., in the environment of a social order; its qualifications are social and moral."<sup>25</sup> Baldwin sees a "moral" element even in such a case of rivalry as the competition between combinations and trusts; this is, to him, rivalry on a higher plane and destined to serve the best interests of society. Baldwin proclaims that "business can only be done on an individualistic or competitive basis," but does not consider the question whether trusts and combinations promote competition or eliminate it. He does not hesitate, however, in his opposition to socialism on the ground that it kills individual incentive—the very factor, he thinks, that makes progress possible. In the free enterprise system Baldwin sees the only sure road to progress. The only moral advice to be given to the business man, in his opinion, is that he should always "desire and struggle for excellence" in the standard of goods produced, excellence of customers, and excellence in his relations with employees and competitors.<sup>26</sup>

It should be repeated here that while Baldwin makes no clear distinction between social evolution and progress, he does suggest at times that progress involves an element of conscious purpose that may be lacking in evolution. This conscious purpose is revealed in the intelligent acts of mankind which give direction to evolution and thus bring about progress. Progress, says Baldwin, is attained "first, by making the individual learn what the race has learned, thus preventing social retro-

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 180.

<sup>25</sup> *Darwin and the Humanities*, p. 60.

<sup>24</sup> *Development and Evolution*, pp. 218-25.

<sup>26</sup> *Individual and Society*, pp. 191-201.

gression, in any case; and second, by putting a direct premium on variations which are socially available.”<sup>27</sup> Only those variations survive that are useful to society and the arbiter of the question of their usefulness is human intelligence.

These observations by Baldwin are not helpful toward an understanding of the difference between social evolution and progress. The difference that he suggests is actually one between evolution and social evolution. In the case of the latter he finds the emergence of intelligence and conscious purpose and reaches the conclusion that at the social level evolution becomes progress. In an article written in collaboration with G. F. Stout of Oxford, Baldwin comes closer to a clear interpretation of progress when he defines the terms as “social evolution considered as determined towards some desirable goal.” He makes the point that evolution may be regarded as progress when the direction of change becomes a matter of general appreciation “from the point of view of worth.” But he goes on to say that while “social evolution is liable to many different statements, in different social groups,” social progress “is necessarily always the same—once fully described, always described—inasmuch as it states the essential action of forces intrinsically and immanently social.”<sup>28</sup> It is rather difficult to reconcile this view with the earlier definition of progress; if progress means an interpretation of evolution “from the point of view of worth,” one should expect the concept of progress to mean different things in different groups and periods, rather than a concept that remains “necessarily always the same.”

In Baldwin’s thinking, the element of “worth” does not actually imply a value judgment of evolution, but means the intrinsic quality of evolution that manifests itself fully at the social level, to be discovered and recognized by all groups. Social evolution may show more or less progress according to its stage of development in a given group or time, but progress itself means “always the same.” It means, as we have seen, an ethical social order in which relations are guided by intelligence and conscious purpose. This is the kind of life that emerges inevitably from social evolution.

<sup>27</sup> *Development and Evolution*, p. 60.

<sup>28</sup> “Social Evolution and Social Progress,” in *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, v. II, pp. 535–36.

MacIver points out in a discussion of evolution and progress that although "there is no necessary opposition between the scientific and the ethical attitude, . . . there is much confusion of the two attitudes, and consequent clashes. For our ethical judgments may rest on misconceptions of the scientific fact and our scientific conclusions may be warped by our ethical preconceptions. The social sciences suffer particularly from this confusion."<sup>29</sup> Baldwin's ideas in regard to evolution and progress and, one might even say, his whole social theory serve as a striking illustration of such confusion.

The major cause of Baldwin's difficulty, to repeat, has been the fact that he used the doctrine of recapitulation as the foundation of his thoughts on social evolution. He translated this doctrine from biological to psychological terms and found that the child in his mental growth not only displays a repetition of the past stages of social evolution, but also indicates the future direction of change. The growth of the individual, says Baldwin, presents "a sort of epitome of recapitulation of racial history,"<sup>30</sup> and "social progress is essentially, in its method, a reproduction of the growth of the individual."<sup>31</sup> When Baldwin discovered the individual as "in substance a microcosm reflecting the group life in miniature,"<sup>32</sup> for him it was a logical next step to read into social life and evolution the conclusions that he had reached in studies of the growth of the child. The results of this effort have already been noted, in part, in our chapter on social organization. We saw there that Baldwin regards the development of society as a repetition of the three main stages of the child's growth—instinctive, spontaneous, and reflective or ethical.

Taking this triadic scheme once again as his guide, Baldwin attempted, in some of his later works, to formulate a theory of the evolution of knowledge. Three main stages of interpretation mark the development of human thought, both in an individual and a social sense. Baldwin designates these stages as "prelogical," "logical," and "hyper-logical." This formulation is regarded by its author as fuller and more adequate than the view of Auguste Comte on the subject. In Comte's scheme the three stages of intellectual development are: the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive. Baldwin considers the

<sup>29</sup> MacIver, *Society*, p. 407.

<sup>31</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 550.

<sup>30</sup> *Individual and Society*, pp. 67-68.

<sup>32</sup> *Individual and Society*, p. 14.

prelogical stage as corresponding to the theological, but he thinks that Comte's metaphysical and positive stages may well be grouped under the heading of logical. However, "the Positivism of the scientific world is not the last word,"<sup>33</sup> says Baldwin; it is in the aesthetic approach to life that the human mind reaches its highest stage, the hyper-logical stage.

Baldwin notes the prelogical mode of interpretation as being characteristic of the mind of the primitive man, and in this observation he finds himself in agreement with the opinion of Lévy-Bruhl.<sup>34</sup> Primitive thought is nothing but a direct reflection of the thought of the group, holds Baldwin; the individual is under social compulsion to think as others do, and is never aware of the value of applying to his ideas the criteria of truth. "We may say without hesitation that primitive interpretation, considered as common meaning or *représentation collective*, is 'syndoxic': that is, it is apprehended by the individual as being the common possession of the group, accepted by others as by himself. He makes no claim to have discovered or even to have confirmed it."<sup>35</sup> There is no room for individual reflection or individual morality in primitive life. At that level, life is "syntelic" rather than "synnomic"—governed by common ends and values, rather than by rules of conduct accepted through individual reflection.<sup>36</sup> Baldwin thinks that the term "theological" may well be applied to the prelogical stage, since life in primitive groups is essentially religious in character.

The mind of the primitive man represents that early stage in the child's life when he is not capable as yet of distinguishing between his own self and others, between "the subject and object selves."<sup>37</sup> The primitive man is so completely identified with his own group that he cannot consider himself, even in a physical sense, a separate being. His "apprehensions and interests are not personal and logical, but social and prelogical. He does not achieve, much less consciously make use of, the dualism of mind and body."<sup>38</sup> The prelogical "period is a-dualistic both

<sup>33</sup> *Genetic Theory of Reality*, p. 39.

<sup>34</sup> Baldwin acknowledges a "convergence" between his views and those of Lévy-Bruhl as stated in *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures* (1910). *Thought and Things*, v. III, preface.

<sup>35</sup> *Genetic Theory of Reality*, p. 47.

<sup>37</sup> *History of Psychology*, v. I, p. 11.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 49.

<sup>38</sup> *Genetic Theory of Reality*, p. 78.

to the child whose self is the animated body, and to the savage whose entire world is a mess of animated things.”<sup>39</sup>

When the development of human thought reaches the second or logical stage, “mind and body, the spiritual and the physical world, take their place as opposing substances existing over against each other.”<sup>40</sup> With the rise of this dualism, man’s interpretation of the world is no longer mystical or religious in character, but becomes “speculative and scientific.” All sciences, Baldwin believes, have followed this course in their development. His study of the *History of Psychology* is primarily an effort to demonstrate this point. The growth of psychology illustrates the fact that “the course of human interpretation presents a series of progressive stages which bear analogy, both in character and in order of appearance, to the stages of the individual’s progressive understanding of the self.”<sup>41</sup> The early period of psychology corresponds to that period in the child’s life when he is still incapable of distinguishing between animate or inanimate objects, or between mind and body. The scientific period of psychology, on the other hand, corresponds to the “reflective” and mature stage in the individual when he recognizes his own self as different from other selves. For psychology and the individual alike interpretation cannot reach the logical stage until a dualism develops “between the self as thinking and judging principle, and all the objects of thought, the ideas, whether these represent mind or body.”<sup>42</sup>

All scientific thought belongs in the logical stage of interpretation. But Baldwin claims that it is when the mind grows beyond this level and reaches the hyper-logical stage that the fullest understanding of reality can be achieved. Such understanding can come only through aesthetic experience. “In the aesthetic contemplation of an object experience achieves the synthetic and full apprehension of reality.”<sup>43</sup> Baldwin describes this experience more specifically as “aesthetic sympathy”; the term carries the same meaning as *Einfühlung* or Empathy.

Baldwin coined the word Pancalism to name his aesthetic theory of reality. He gives a summary of the “pancalistic doctrine” in the following

<sup>39</sup> *History of Psychology*, v. II, p. 185.

<sup>40</sup> *Genetic Theory of Reality*, p. 141.

<sup>41</sup> *History of Psychology*, v. II, p. 163.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 195.

<sup>43</sup> *Genetic Theory of Reality*, p. 231.

statement: "There is here [in the aesthetic] a higher psychical immediacy in which all the dualisms of the mental life, at the stage reached, may on occasion merge in an immediate contemplative value of real presence; the dualisms of 'theoretical and practical,' 'mind and body,' 'inner and outer,' 'freedom and necessity,' all merge to the vanishing point in the aesthetic."<sup>44</sup>

Prelogical, logical, hyper-logical; a-dualism, dualism, pancalism or the final synthesis—these, then, are the stages that mark the course of the development of human thought from the lowest to the highest level of apprehension and interpretation. "My best thought of nature, my type of philosophy," writes Baldwin, "is an Idealism which finds that the universe of science is, when all is said, a cosmos which is not only true but also beautiful, and in some sense good . . . I say it is true and good because it is beautiful."<sup>45</sup>

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. viii.

<sup>45</sup> *Fragments in Philosophy and Science*, p. ix.

## *Chapter Five*

### *SOCIOLOGY: ITS NATURE AND SCOPE*

**F**OR an adequate interpretation of Baldwin's views on sociology it is necessary to consider first his position in regard to the subject of science. We saw, in the last chapter, that Baldwin places all science in that stage of development of thought which he calls "logical." In his opinion, there are two main categories of science—the "agenetic" and the "genetic." The physical sciences are said to be agenetic, whereas the sciences that deal with life processes and society are genetic.

In the case of such sciences as physics and chemistry the chief method of study is that of cross-section analysis. "The postulates of this procedure are '*uniformity*' and '*lawfullness*'."<sup>1</sup> The changes that are observed in the phenomena are of a mechanical character. Changes that occur at one level of development can be explained and predicted in terms of the changes that take place at a preceding level. Changes of this nature can be measured and expressed in quantitative formulas.

The phenomena of life are of entirely different character. The changes that occur here exhibit qualitative differences from one level of growth to the next. Life processes call for a scientific approach that is genetic and affords a longitudinal view of the subject. The quantitative techniques of the agenetic sciences are inadequate as means toward an understanding of the non-predictable developments in the mental and social spheres. In the words of Baldwin,

Only when *quantitatively considered* are natural sequences exhausted by mechanical changes, and *qualitative differences* are as universal and natural as are *quantitative identities*. There must be a revision of the notion of causation, to allow for the qualitative growth processes of life and mind, for the new modes of qualitative appearance that the genetic or developmental series of changes show. All vital, mental

<sup>1</sup> *Development and Evolution*, p. 301.

and social series of changes are of this sort: they are really dynamic, genetic. A psychological effect is not "equivalent" to its antecedent conditions, considered as its cause nor in any way identical with them in a qualitative sense . . . *Nature achieves novelties*; there may be, qualitatively speaking, *more or less in the effect than there is in the cause.*<sup>2</sup>

Baldwin uses the term "genetic modes" to designate the unique phenomena that may emerge in the evolutionary process. "I contend that absolutely new and unheard-of phases of reality may 'arise and shine' at any moment in any natural series of events—constituting new 'genetic modes.'"<sup>3</sup> "Genetic modes" give to evolution an "irreversible" character, Baldwin holds, since each new development is *sui generis* in a qualitative sense. Each development in the "genetic progression" exhibits a new "form of synthesis" that cannot be explained by formulations that may have proved adequate in the interpretation of events at earlier levels. In genetic progression "A becomes B," as distinguished from "A is B" which applies to phenomena of agenetic nature.<sup>4</sup>

However, it does not follow from the above, as Baldwin carefully points out, that the interpretation of phenomena occurring at "higher" levels invalidates scientific formulations that have explained events at "lower" or earlier levels in the same genetic series. The important thing for each genetic science is to develop its own methods and formulations to interpret the particular genetic modes in its own field. Series of phenomena observed in more than one field may exhibit parallel but not identical genetic modes. Generalizations based upon analogy are misleading and should be avoided.<sup>5</sup> "The carrying over of established formulas, or the analogous application of established principles, often with the question-begging application of the same terms, from one mode of phenomena to another," this practice, which incidentally is still quite common in some schools of sociological thought, Baldwin brands as "the bane of contemporary science other than physical." He goes on to remark that "the theory of evolution is responsible for much of this cheap apology for science—biology used in sociology, physics in psychology, the concept of energy in history, etc. Evolution has been mis-

<sup>2</sup> *Darwin and the Humanities*, p. 86.

<sup>4</sup> *Thoughts and Things*, v. I, p. 23.

<sup>3</sup> *Development and Evolution*, p. 305.

<sup>5</sup> *Development and Evolution*, p. 323.

taken for reduction, the highest genetic modes being 'explained' in terms of the lowest, and much of the explaining done by 'explaining away' most that is characteristic of the highest. And biological and organic evolution itself is a storehouse of mistaken analogies brought over into the moral sciences."<sup>6</sup>

Baldwin's theory of genetic modes is a statement of principles which have come to be associated with the doctrine of emergent evolution.<sup>7</sup> From a methodological point of view, these principles are of great significance. The main assumption of Baldwin is that matter, life, and mind form an ascending evolutionary series of levels, and that each level represents a new form of integration which can only be interpreted by laws that hold for the particular level only.

Sociologists who adopt the methods and techniques of the physical or "prestige" sciences in an attempt to raise their own field to the level of an "exact" discipline have been, in recent times, subjected to some well-justified criticism. Their attention has been called to the need of recognizing the distinctive nature of the subject matter of sociology and of developing methods of their own, based on such recognition. This school of criticism had in Baldwin one of its earliest advocates. "Sociology has not yet come into its full scientific heritage," he writes, partly because the discipline "has been the dupe of those who bring to her the catchwords of other sciences . . . Social changes are conditioned upon physical, chemical, and biological facts; this may be admitted without discussion. But it is quite a different thing to say that the scientific formulas which are found fruitful in those sciences are adequate instruments of interpretation of the social as such; for on such a view the social life loses its intimate and firsthand character as personal experience . . . The positive science of society must be built upon the facts of social observation and experience; and such a science must be

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 334.

<sup>7</sup> Wilbur M. Urban goes so far as to say that Baldwin's "doctrine of *genetic modes* is the first, and in some respects, still a classical presentation of what has come to be known as *emergent evolution*." *Psychological Review*, v. XLII (1935), p. 305.

In an article published in 1930 Baldwin claims that his genetic theories "have turned out to be the corner stones of the various theories of 'creative' or 'emergent' evolution now in vogue." He adds that "the word 'emergent' simply expresses by another term the 'becomes' or 'passes into' of our formula." *History of Psychology in Autobiography*, v. I, pp. 7-9.

given the same right to establish the criteria of its proper facts that we allow the other sciences.”<sup>8</sup>

The fact that Baldwin regards “personal experience” as a major characteristic of the social explains his belief that psychological studies of that experience are the things that can supply the necessary foundation to a science of society. He asserts repeatedly that the sociologist who fails to take fully into account the psychological factors operating in a given situation can have very little of value to contribute.

Baldwin’s views on sociology are revealed most clearly in his discussions of the relationship of this science to psychology. Social phenomena being of a genetic order their study can lead to adequate results only if the two sciences focus attention on the functional and developmental aspects of the subject. It should be noted at this point that the kind of psychology Baldwin has in mind here is social psychology. Sociology can be brought “into vital relation” only with a psychology that is “social to the core,”<sup>9</sup> he remarks. Baldwin holds that most of the sociological works produced up to his day might be characterized as failures because the observations and conclusions they contain have been based upon “an unsocial psychology.” Such a psychology assumes that man is a “socialized individual self.” Social psychology, on the contrary, starts out with the assumption that man is an “individualized social self.” “It thus reverses the point of view of historical individualism, and gives collectivism its *point d’appui* in the processes of mental development itself.”<sup>10</sup>

The unit, then, that social psychology takes as its subject of study is the “socius, a more or less socialized individual, fitted to enter into fruitful social relations.”<sup>11</sup> The “objective” aspects of social relations supply the subject matter of sociology. But the study of these relations cannot be carried out if the sociologist lacks an understanding of the nature of the “socius.” “It is the first requirement of a theory of society,” writes Baldwin, “that it shall have adequate views of the progress of the social whole which shall be consistent with the psychology of the individual’s

<sup>8</sup> “The Basis of Social Solidarity,” in *American Journal of Sociology*, v. XV (1910), pp. 817-31. A paper read before a meeting of the Institut internationale de sociologie, Berne, 1909.

<sup>9</sup> “Sketch of the History of Psychology,” in *Psychological Review*, v. XII (1905), pp. 163-64.

<sup>10</sup> *History of Psychology*, v. II, pp. 128-29. <sup>11</sup> *Darwin and the Humanities*, p. 43.

personal growth." The investigation of the social and individual aspects of the whole should begin with a study of the growth of the "socius"; this provides "a bridge on which it is safe to travel, and from which we can get vistas of the country on both sides."<sup>12</sup>

Social psychology and sociology deal, respectively, with the individual and collective aspects of phenomena that are basically "mental" in character. Society is a "body of mental products, an established network of psychical relationships."<sup>13</sup> The first of these disciplines is concerned with the question—"by what mental process men actually are social and show social organization?" The second deals with the problem—"what is going on between or among men who are socially organized?"<sup>14</sup> From a genetic point of view, "for both these sciences *the subject matter is sui generis*: for [social] psychology, it is an experience *sui generis*; for sociology, it is a mode of organization *sui generis*. Sociology can properly investigate it only by detailed and exhaustive investigations of the forms it actually shows."<sup>15</sup> The distinctions that are made here should not lead to the impression, Baldwin insists, that there can be any real separation between the individual and the collective aspects of the social process. "The movements are one, although the sciences from their necessary differences in point of view, must treat them as if they were two."<sup>16</sup>

Baldwin believes that because of the nature of its subject matter sociology can never assume the position of a special science. He classifies the social sciences into two major divisions—general and special. Under the heading of general he places sociology and social philosophy; under special he groups social psychology, political science, economics, ethics, criminology, and so forth. The general science of sociology is divided in turn into two branches—the comparative and the genetic. Sociology is "the genetic and comparative study of social groups; that is, the study of the origin and relationships of social groups as such. Sociology is thus a general social science, as contrasted with the special social sciences,

<sup>12</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 90.

<sup>13</sup> *History of Psychology*, v. II, pp. 130-31.

<sup>14</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 531.

<sup>15</sup> "The Basis of Social Solidarity," in *American Journal of Sociology*, v. XV (1910), p. 829.

<sup>16</sup> *Individual and Society*, p. 16.

which deal with the composition, elements, and internal organization of social groups."<sup>17</sup> As a comparative science sociology is concerned with the interpretation of the contributions of the special social sciences, and in this role sociology enters the realm of social philosophy. As a genetic science sociology deals with the conditions that influence the origin, development, and interrelations of social groups. This genetic branch of sociology Baldwin calls "socionomics."<sup>18</sup>

The main task of sociology, in Baldwin's opinion, is the study of "socionomic forces" which he defines as "forces, themselves not social, which condition or direct the operation of social forces and so enter into the determination of social organization and progress." The investigation of social forces proper is the job of social psychology rather than of sociology, according to Baldwin, who identifies social force with "the ground of social change so far as it is internal or intrinsic to the social organization in which the change occurs."<sup>19</sup>

The distinction that Baldwin makes between social and socionomic forces is one of the striking features of his social theory. It is based on his belief that no adequate and total understanding of society can be gained without distinguishing clearly between the "internal" and "external," the "subjective" and "objective" aspects of social phenomena.

Before we pass to a discussion of the socionomic forces, we must consider more fully at this point what Baldwin means by social forces and the social. Social forces are purely psychological in character and express the operation of the thoughts of individuals interacting on a conscious level in a given group. The thoughts of individuals constitute the core of the social. Thoughts may be regarded as social forces when they become factors affecting the organization and changes of society. Baldwin distinguishes, we have noted earlier, between "particularizing social forces" and "generalizing social forces." The terms refer, respectively, to the inventive and to the imitative aspects of social change. The new thoughts that the individual contributes to the group reflect his particular reaction to, or interpretation of, the already established social

<sup>17</sup> "Sociology," in *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, v. II, p. 544. (This definition by Baldwin has been endorsed fully by Tarde and Giddings.)

<sup>18</sup> *Individual and Society*, pp. 202-10.

<sup>19</sup> *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, v. II, pp. 537, 546.

thoughts in the group. When the group, in turn, takes these particular thoughts and through imitation makes them part of its own traditions, individual thoughts become generalized.

To Baldwin the real "matter" of social organization is thought. Imitation is merely the mechanism, the "method" through which such organization comes into being. Imitation can be considered social only if it supplies the means of organizing individual thoughts into social thoughts, and only those thoughts can become social that supply new "copies for imitation." Baldwin repeatedly calls attention to the need of distinguishing clearly between the "matter" and "method" of social organization. The confusion between the two, or the substitution of one for the other, he considers responsible for the inadequacy of a great number of social theories. While he notes with approval the efforts of a number of contemporary "writers in so-called 'sociology' to examine the psychological processes which lie wrapped up in the activities . . . called social,"<sup>20</sup> he finds no satisfactory answer in their works to the question of what actually constitutes the social. Tarde's *Lois de l'imitation*, for example, fails to reveal "what is imitable," in the opinion of Baldwin. He points out that Tarde's interpretations may be adequate enough as far as they apply to the gregarious or emotional stages of social organization, but they do not explain the reflective or highest stage of organization where the social bond is created only through the imitation of thought.

Baldwin goes so far as to attack even Durkheim's view of "constraint" on the ground that the heavy emphasis which it places upon suggestion turns the attention to the means of social organization and leaves the subject of social matter untouched. Theorists who find in sympathy an explanation of socialization are equally unconvincing to Baldwin who regards sympathy as merely an emotional by-product of the process. He insists that thought-relations can be established only through imitation, and that without imitative identity there can be no "putting of oneself in another's shoes."

The most inadequate explanation of the social is to be found in the theory of Giddings, according to Baldwin, who dismisses it with the following remark: "We reach the climax of descriptive vagueness in a

<sup>20</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 492.

formula, wide enough to include all the rest—the 'consciousness of kind' . . . It is no more an explanation than is the phrase 'love of drink' an explanation of inherited tendency to alcoholism."<sup>21</sup> The real matter of social organization at the highest or reflective level cannot be instinct or consciousness of kind, Baldwin points out. These may be taken as constituting the social at early stages of organization, but are meaningless as interpretations of the social bond in a highly evolved group. Life in such a group is marked by plasticity of behavior and accommodation guided by thought. At this stage of organization one may speak of a "consciousness of kind" only in the sense of a "reflective consciousness of kind."

Baldwin believes that sociologists should leave the study of the social to social psychologists and limit their investigations to an analysis of the extra-social or socionomic factors that influence social life. Sociology, conceived as socionomics, is defined by him as "the science of the relation of social life to its environment, including other social groups."<sup>22</sup>

The relation between social and socionomic forces Baldwin considered to be similar to the relation between psychological and physiological factors. Just as physiological conditions that stimulate certain mental states are not themselves psychological, the influences exerted by the environment that bring about social changes cannot be regarded as social. "It would be just as appropriate to call blood-changes psychological facts, as to call physical changes, such as the cutting of the Suez Canal, social facts."<sup>23</sup>

While in a highly evolved society socionomic forces have their source mainly in the physical environment, Baldwin maintains that at lower levels of organization such factors as group selection and individual selection might also be considered extra-social conditioning forces. In lower stages of social organization competition between groups, through physical or economic conflict, is similar in its operation and results to natural selection in the biological sphere. The groups that prove "fit" in such competition survive. But at higher levels of organization the life and development of society is determined by inner social forces rather

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 500-01.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 484. This view anticipates an approach that has been generally identified with what has come to be known as the ecological school of sociology.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 485.

than by external socioeconomic factors. Baldwin accepts Bagehot's view that as society evolves discussion comes to replace crude competition as a means to selection. It is necessary, Baldwin says, to distinguish

between the evolution of the social group *as a whole*, under conditions of natural selection and competition with other groups, and the *inner development of the social life within the group*. It is the latter only that is truly social; the former takes account of the conditions, external and auxiliary, but not intrinsic, under which the inner organization takes place and progresses. The evolution of racial, communal, and civil types is most interesting and important; but the statement of the geographical, biological, and other conditions under which such differences arise gives no account whatever of the essential social bond, inner and intrinsic, that *characterizes each and all of the types alike*. This is mental and moral, not physical nor vital.<sup>24</sup>

Individual selection is also an important socioeconomic factor to Baldwin, but again important only at early stages of organization where physical competition between individuals is prevalent. At higher stages individual selection becomes a result of social rather than biological competition. The inherited bodily traits of "desirable" or "undesirable" nature that individuals possess, profoundly affect their relations with others. But these influences are again extra-social factors and do not become social until they begin to be manifested in the psychological processes of like or dislike.

The main task of sociology, as a socioeconomic science, should be the study of all the conditions in the physical environment that influence social organization. "All this," says Baldwin, "gives to sociology a range, complexity, and difficulty which delay its progress, but do not disprove its right to exist."<sup>25</sup> What may delay the progress of the science, he thinks, is the tendency of sociologists to confuse the extra-social with the social, or to mistake the conditioning factors for the real social forces. "Only psychological sources of change can be called 'social forces.'"<sup>26</sup>

Some critics, notably Ellwood, have pointed out that Baldwin has left out of consideration many factors, such as rivalry, hunger, fear, sex,

<sup>24</sup> *Individual and Society*, pp. 9-10.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 209.

<sup>26</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 490.

acquisition, and so forth, which might very well be regarded as important in any analysis of social organization. Baldwin's response to this has been that such factors are merely socioeconomic and "not intrinsically social." The only two things that are intrinsically social are thought and the kind of imitation that serves as a means to the growth and propagation of thought. The "other things" belong to the sociologist . . . but not to the social psychologist.<sup>27</sup>

Baldwin's views on the nature and scope of sociology and its relation to social psychology are summed up in the following statement:

Society is . . . a mode of organization *sui generis*; its matter is psychological; its rules of organization are those which characterize the personal development of minds in relation to one another. To this no analogy, drawn from another sphere of fact, biological, chemical, physical, can do any sort of justice: it can be understood only by the knowledge, direct and indirect, of the motives and movements of minds capable of certain modes of intercourse. Sociology itself, dealing with the external and historical aspects of social life, must allow and demand the psychological interpretation of its results. Anything short of this deprives social theory of its most fruitful points of view, and, so far as it has practical applications, distorts the social fact and mutilates the social body.<sup>28</sup>

The position that Baldwin has taken in regard to sociology is little more than a reflection of his psychologist's bias toward the field. He has set out with the assumption that the study of society should be the study of conscious interactions between men.<sup>29</sup> This is sound enough. But he goes further and claims that conscious relations imply nothing but thought and imitation and that these alone supply the "matter" and "means" of social relations. Baldwin insists that since thought and imitation are psychological phenomena, their analysis should be exclusively the task of social psychology. The social thus being a psychological fact, sociologists cannot be expected to deal with it with competence; their job should be limited to the investigation of extra-social, conditioning factors. One of the major difficulties with Baldwin is the result of his failure to recognize that thought and imitation may also often be noth-

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>28</sup> *Individual and Society*, pp. 8-9.

<sup>29</sup> Cf., p. 36.

ing but conditions affecting social relations, and that what he conceives as purely external conditions are in many cases just as much part of the social as thought and imitation. The distinction that he makes between social and socioeconomic factors is artificial; it can be traced back to his belief that social organization is nothing but a counterpart of individual mental development, both presenting in their changes and growth an unfolding of the inner twin-processes of thought and imitation.

Baldwin is emphatic in his assertion that no fruitful study of society can be accomplished without the close cooperation of social psychology and sociology. It is not difficult to see, however, that acceptance of his views as to the distinctive functions of these sciences would lead to the creation of a wall rather than to greater contact between the two disciplines. Neither as a comparative nor as a socioeconomic science can sociology accomplish anything if it is denied the right to study the social directly. How can sociology be expected to interpret the results of special social sciences or to study conditioning factors if it can have no direct approach to the subjects and phenomena to which these are related? Baldwin speaks of the need of cooperation, but at the same time assigns to sociology a position ancillary to social psychology by maintaining that it is the latter science that has sole rights to the social.

## *Chapter Six*

# **CONCLUSION**

**T**HE main significance of Baldwin's social theory is to be found not in the particular formulations and interpretations that it offers, but in the fact that it stimulated the growth of a school of thought which still holds a prominent place in American sociology.

A summary of Baldwin's contributions should begin with mention of his study of the origin and development of personality. His theory of the "socius" marked one of the earliest attempts to analyze thoroughly the nature of the individual as an outcome of the social environment. It was this phase of his work that brought Baldwin wide recognition as one of the leading pioneers of American social psychology.<sup>1</sup> He had much to do, unquestionably, with the introduction into sociology of a psychological point of view that helped free the discipline from the shackles of crude biological formulations.

Systematic studies of the social growth of the individual and his relations to the group began in this country toward the close of the nineteenth century. Investigations in this subject marked the gradual rise of social psychology as a differentiated discipline. The development of this new field took three distinct directions. One of these came to be known as the imitation school; another, as the instinct school; and finally the third, as the so-called environmental school. Baldwin's work shows affiliations with each of these trends and his position has been described by some critics as "cross-sectional." However, although Baldwin's system has been closely associated with the imitation school and reflects certain elements of the instinct point of view, the positive importance of his work lies in the contributions that he made to the development of what L. L. Bernard calls "the environmentalist school of

<sup>1</sup> "It may be said with substantial truth," remarks House, "that modern American social psychology was founded by Baldwin." This estimate is shared by many other commentators. Floyd N. House, *The Development of Sociology* (New York, 1936), p. 317.

personality analysis." This last approach places the chief emphasis upon the social environment and social interaction in the development of the self.

Although the books of Baldwin had directed some attention to the theory of imitation, its wide acceptance in the early days of social psychology in America was the result of the work of Edward A. Ross. His *Social Psychology*, which was published in 1908, was the first book bearing that title to appear in this country. Baldwin's views on imitation were developed, as we have seen, independently of those of Tarde and differ from the latter's formulations in many points. While Baldwin looked upon imitation primarily as a mechanism of growth of the self, Ross followed closely Tarde's example and used imitation as a key to the interpretation of those forces in society that operate upon the individual to make him conform to the ways and traditions of the group. Ross's book attempts to interpret social relations on the basis of the "two great construction lines—conventionality and custom—yielded by [Tarde's] incomparable *Lois de l'imitation*."<sup>2</sup>

McDougall's *Introduction to Social Psychology*, which was published during the same year as the work of Ross, marked the beginning of another important approach to the problem of the individual's relations to the group. The main thesis of the book is summed up in the statement that "directly or indirectly the instincts are the prime movers of all human activity . . . These impulses are the mental forces that maintain and shape all the life of individuals and societies, and in them we are confronted with the central mystery of life and mind and will."<sup>3</sup> The influence of the English psychologist on American social-psychological thought was even more profound and lasting than that of the theorists of imitation. McDougall's position is closely linked to the assumptions that form the core of what sometimes is described as the "psychological school" of sociology. This school of thought "starts with the psychological characteristics of an individual, takes them as variables, and tries to interpret social phenomena as their derivative or manifestation."<sup>4</sup> Baldwin's system reflects, in a limited sense, this mode of reasoning. While

<sup>2</sup> E. A. Ross, *Social Psychology* (New York, 1908), p. viii.

<sup>3</sup> William McDougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (London, 1908), pp. 45-46.

<sup>4</sup> Pitirim Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (New York, 1928), p. 600.

he has repeatedly attacked the instinct interpretations of social behavior, Baldwin's views on imitation have at times suggested a position that is hardly different from that of the instinct theorists. He has often presented imitation as an inherited mechanism toward a definite form of previously unlearned behavior, much in the same sense as instincts are supposed to operate.

However, as we noted above, the work of Baldwin is of significance chiefly as one of the earliest attempts to study the growth of the self in the social environment and through social interaction. In this, his contributions have a closer and more direct relation to those of William James, Charles H. Cooley, and George H. Mead. Baldwin's relation and indebtedness to James has already been touched upon in an earlier chapter. We shall discuss here those particular elements in the theories of the social self of Cooley and of Mead that mark an advance over the views of Baldwin on this subject.

The names of Cooley and Baldwin are closely linked especially in discussions of the self theory in sociology. Baldwin's influence on Cooley has no doubt been profound, but the latter found the less rigid and less formalized thoughts of James on the problem even more stimulating. What Cooley says on this point is of particular interest:

This idea that social persons are not mutually exclusive but composed largely of common elements is implied in Professor William James's doctrine of the Social Self and set forth at more length in Professor James Mark Baldwin's *Social and Ethical Interpretations of Mental Development*. Like other students of social psychology I have received much instruction and even more helpful provocation from the latter brilliant and original work. To Professor James my obligation is perhaps greater still.<sup>5</sup>

Cooley's theory of the social self has proved of greater and more lasting value than that of Baldwin. The reasons for this are quite clear. The work of Cooley on this problem is not hampered with the elements of recapitulation and imitation which have had such a large place in Baldwin's speculations. Cooley was "distrustful" of Baldwin's contention

<sup>5</sup> Charles H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (Rev. ed., New York, 1922), p. 125.

that in the mental growth of children the history of the race is recapitulated. He was equally critical of the idea that imitation is the mechanism of the genesis and growth of the social self. Cooley presented his views in a language that is lucid and readable, and free of the confusing and jumbled terminology that fills the writings of Baldwin.

To Cooley, as to Baldwin, the self is a social outcome rather than a unit, and the mind of the individual is a product of social interaction. Both writers start out with the assumption that the individual and society can not be regarded as separate entities, that the two are parts of an organic whole, and that they should be studied as aspects of that unity.

Following the example of Baldwin, Cooley sought support for these views in observations of the behavior of his children. One of the first things Cooley noted was that the child "cannot imitate an act except by learning how to do it."<sup>6</sup> In Baldwin's opinion, it will be remembered, the child cannot learn anything except by imitating; it is through imitation that he learns to be a social being. Cooley's criticism of this assumption is pertinent. Imitation, he says,

is sometimes spoken of as if it were a mysterious something that enabled the child to perform unvoluntarily and without preparation acts that are quite new to him. It will be found difficult, if one reflects upon the matter, to conceive what could be the nature of an instinct or hereditary tendency, not to do a definite thing previously performed by our ancestors—as in the case with ordinary instinct—but to do *anything*, within vague limits, which happened to be done within our sight or hearing. This doing of new things without definite preparation, *either in heredity or experience*, would seem to involve something like special creation in the mental and nervous organism; and the imitation of children has no such character.<sup>7</sup>

Cooley believed that if it is necessary to explain the growth of the social self in terms of some hereditary factor, such a factor should be sought not in imitation but merely in the individual's "capacity and need for social feeling" or "sociability." Furthermore, he saw no need of reducing the development of the self to any formula of distinct stages as Baldwin had done. To Cooley there are no sharply perceptible grada-

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62.

tions in the process that leads to the rise of the social being. In this process the child's capacity for sociability is regarded by Cooley as something inseparable from the child's "impulse to communicate." Communication, through gestures and language, is what makes the emergence of the social self possible. "The social self is simply any idea, or system of ideas, drawn from the communicative life, that the mind cherishes as its own."<sup>8</sup> This is a concept that Cooley described as "the reflected or looking-glass self." In this sense the self is the individual's reflection of himself in the minds of others. "The life of the mind is essentially a life of intercourse," concluded Cooley, and "the imaginations which people have of one another are the *solid facts* of society."<sup>9</sup>

The process of the development of the social self was, thus, analyzed by Cooley mainly in terms of communication. With Baldwin, communication, particularly on the language level, was something that could not come into play as a socializing factor until the child could begin to imitate. The chief difference between Baldwin and the theorists who followed him in studies of the self is marked by a shift of emphasis from imitation to the more basic and inclusive factor of communication. The latter approach found one of its strongest exponents in George H. Mead.

Mead's criticism of Baldwin's imitation theory has already been noted in an earlier chapter. That criticism is summed up in the observation that "imitation becomes comprehensible when there is a consciousness of other selves, and not before."<sup>10</sup> This is a point that was fully recognized by Cooley whose work Mead considered a great advance over that of Baldwin. "The superiority of Cooley's position," says Mead, "lies in his freedom to find in consciousness a social process going on, within which the self and other arise. By placing both phases of this social process in the same consciousness, by regarding the self as the ideas entertained by others of the self, and the other as the ideas entertained of him by the self, the action of the others upon the self and of the self upon the others becomes simply the interaction of ideas upon each other within the mind."<sup>11</sup> But although Mead had praise for this effort to interpret

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 179.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 97 and 122.

<sup>10</sup> George H. Mead, "Social Psychology as Counterpart of Physiological Psychology," in *Psychological Bulletin*, v. 6 (1909), p. 405.

<sup>11</sup> George H. Mead, "Cooley's Contributions to American Social Thought," in *American Journal of Sociology*, v. 35 (1930), p. 693.

the self in terms of social interaction without resort to such mechanisms as imitation, he was not fully satisfied with Cooley's general position. Mead charged that Cooley's social psychology is "inevitably introspective, and his psychological method carries with it the implication of complete solipsism."<sup>12</sup>

In his own theory of the social self Mead attempts to present an interpretation that is both "objective" and "naturalistic," and free of the idealistic presuppositions that he claimed had limited earlier studies in this field. Mead's approach to the subject is sometimes described as "social behaviorism" because it represents an effort to treat the mind and the self mainly in terms of function and observable experience. According to Mead the genesis and growth of the social self can best be understood by an analysis of the individual's behavior or "social act," and by avoiding reference to questionable causal factors such as instinct or imitation. In the "social act," says Mead, "one individual serves in his actions as a stimulus to a response from another individual."<sup>13</sup> The important point in this process of inter-stimulation is not that some individuals may repeat the actions of others, but that the conduct of the individual "is a stimulus to another to a certain act, and that this act again becomes a stimulus to the first to a certain reaction, and so on in ceaseless interaction." Mead calls this process "conversation of attitudes."<sup>14</sup>

Mead agrees with Baldwin that one of the most significant stages in the child's life is when he begins to respond differently to stimulations that come to him from persons and those that come from physical objects. The basic condition of the growth of the self is the capacity of the individual to respond to the attitudes and gestures of others. The social self comes into being as the individual begins to "take the role" of others and to respond to his own assumption of roles as he responds to others. The successive assumption of various roles leads to what Mead terms the "generalized other." "The organized community or social group which gives to the individual his unity of self may be called *the generalized*

<sup>12</sup> George H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago, 1934), p. 224.

<sup>13</sup> George H. Mead, "Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of Meaning," in *Psychological Bulletin*, v. 7 (1910), p. 397.

<sup>14</sup> Mead, "Social Psychology as Counterpart to Physiological Psychology," in *Psychological Bulletin*, v. 6 (1909), p. 406.

other. The attitude of the generalized other is the attitude of the whole community."<sup>15</sup> The self is merely another term for one's responses to his group.

The basic points in the theories of the social self of Cooley and Mead, which we have outlined here, indicate the direction that the study of the subject has taken since Baldwin made his contribution. The trend has been toward a greater emphasis on an empirical approach to the problem. Even though Cooley did much to free the analysis of the socialization of the individual from such particularisms as imitation, it was left to Mead to offer the first thoroughly objective interpretation of the mechanism that is involved in the rise of the self.

The identification of Baldwin's name with the theory of imitation has certainly been one of the major reasons why his whole work has been regarded by many critics as outdated. Faris says that "in America Baldwin made the concept of imitation permanent, but the work of Cooley . . . gradually deflected attention from the over-simplified conclusions of the imitation school."<sup>16</sup> It may be added that the work of Cooley and others not only deflected attention from Baldwin's theory of imitation, but also from his solid contributions to sociology.

Baldwin's view of the "socius" is closely related to his conception of society as an organization that is basically psychological in character. One of his more valuable thoughts in this connection is to be found in his suggestion that the study of society should be primarily a study of the phenomena rising from the consciously experienced interactions between the members of the group. But Baldwin failed to develop this point adequately and his observations on the subject are obscured by his dogmatic assertions that society is a large-scale repetition or reflection of the mental life of the child, and that at its most evolved stage social organization represents nothing but a unit of ethical cooperation. Baldwin was not much interested in seeking the principles and laws of the social order in the phenomena that are peculiar to that order of life; he had already discovered them in the mind of the child. His studies of society might have led to fruitful results if he himself had followed the advice which he gave to sociologists:

<sup>15</sup> Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*, p. 154.

<sup>16</sup> Ellsworth Faris, *The Nature of Human Nature* (New York, 1937), p. 157.

Sociology is often merely a mass of formal and verbal distinctions, dealing with theoretical conceptions, which do not admit of proof other than that of logical deduction. Definitions of "society," "association," "solidarity," "progress," etc. are constructed from purely personal points of view, from which there is no control from the observation of the social facts. The need therefore, is for extended and patient observation of actual social changes, happenings, phenomena of every kind, as they show themselves—observations of these both in their own right, and also in the conditions of the environment, physical and biological in which they occur.<sup>17</sup>

From the point of view of sociology, another of Baldwin's suggestive contributions is to be found in his observation that a clear distinction should be made between the nature of the phenomena studied by the social sciences and the nature of the subject matter of the physical sciences, and that physical science methods are not necessarily adequate as tools for the analysis of human relations. Baldwin held that if the sciences dealing with men and society are to progress they will have to develop new methods of research of their own, based upon a full recognition of the "genetic" nature of their subject matter as distinguished from the "agenetic" order of reality in the physical world. Baldwin's theory of "genetic modes" led him to the conclusion that society represents "an organization *sui generis*" whose unique and dynamic nature can best be understood through a developmental and functional approach free from any analogical reasoning. This position is rather difficult to reconcile with the approach that Baldwin actually adopted in his own study of society. His preoccupation with the dialectic and recapitulation formulas led him to a concept of society whose characteristics are repetitive and predictable rather than emergent and dynamic.

Baldwin has often been praised for the important part he played in introducing into sociology an experimental and objective point of view. He was not a thinker of the "armchair" type," says Ellwood; on the contrary, he "based his theories upon extensive observation and considerable experimentation."<sup>18</sup> It is true that Baldwin tried to test his

<sup>17</sup> "The Basis of Social Solidarity," in *American Journal of Sociology*, v. XV (1910), pp. 817.

<sup>18</sup> Ellwood, "The Social Philosophy of James Mark Baldwin," *Journal of Social Philosophy*, v. II (1936), p. 68.

hypotheses regarding human nature by close observation of the behavior of his children, but the scientific mood is absent from much of his speculations about the larger sphere of social relations. Here his theories were based not so much on direct observation, but on what he considered to be the "laws" of behavior as revealed in the mental life of his children.

This résumé of some of the more significant points in Baldwin's social theory should be enough to indicate that he had a great deal more to offer in the way of original thoughts to the sociology of his day than many of his contemporary theorists. The fact remains, however, that the direct influence of Baldwin's works on the field has been of a rather limited character. The reason for this cannot be supplied by merely pointing to this or that weakness in his general position. Much has been made, as we have seen, of the point that Baldwin's theories of the social self and society have proved no more enduring than the dogma of imitation which has received so much emphasis in those theories. While it cannot be questioned that imitation has been one of the major encumbrances of Baldwin's system, it would be naïve to hold that the whole structure of that system can be undermined by the invalidation of the theory of imitation. William James once criticized Wundt's position in these words: "Cut him up like a worm, and each fragment crawls; there is no *noeud vital* in his medulla oblongata, so that you can't kill him all at once."<sup>19</sup> This observation may justly be applied to Baldwin's system as well.

The fact that Baldwin's works hold a somewhat limited place in present day sociology may be explained, in part, as due to his retirement from the American academic scene at the peak of his career. A fuller explanation, however, is to be found in the particular nature of his scientific work. As sources of many germinal ideas Baldwin's theories should have proved of greater value to sociology, but those ideas appear to have lost some of their significance and validity in the rigid formulations in which their author presented them. Baldwin had many original and brilliant observations to offer, but he forced them into the framework of a system which in its final form became a body of unyielding and somewhat sterile principles. Cooley has said that "if a man has a system . . . he himself may well beware of it lest he write merely to fill it

<sup>19</sup> Letter to Carl Stumpf (Feb. 6, 1897), in *Letters of William James*, ed. by Henry James (Boston, 1920), v. I, p. 263.

out. I find my own system tiresome to think of, except at rare intervals, and no doubt others will find it more so. We love truth best when it makes us free." <sup>20</sup> One may well wonder if Baldwin ever experienced a similar reaction toward his own work; he was too much of an intellectual prisoner of his own system to have been able to look upon it with any degree of critical objectivity.

The best answer to the question why his social theory failed to achieve greater recognition in sociology is given in a penetrating observation that Cooley noted in his journals at a period when Baldwin's prestige was at its highest:

A great fault with strenuous writers like Baldwin is that in their eagerness to produce they do not allow time enough for their imaginations to grow naturally and thoroughly into the mastery of a subject. They force it, and so impair its spontaneity, its sanity and humanness. What they write may be stimulating, consecutive, attractive for a time, but it is not food to live on. A style like this Goethe calls mannerism or "das manirierte." If you wish to produce anything of lasting value, you must see to it that the *subject matter, the truth*, is the first interest of your mind, *not your books, your essay, yourself as discoverer and communicator of truth*.<sup>21</sup>

Few readers of Baldwin will disagree with this appraisal of his work, but it should not be forgotten that the real value of his contributions goes far beyond the form that they took in his writings and system. Baldwin's thoughts did much to stimulate wide interest in many of the fundamental problems of sociology, and he stands as one of the great pioneers in the field.

<sup>20</sup> Charles H. Cooley, *Life and the Student* (New York, 1927), p. 117.

<sup>21</sup> Unpublished journals of C. H. Cooley, v. XIII, p. 30 (February 22, 1898) (University of Michigan Library).

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